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Abstract
This paper investigates the effectiveness of macroprudential policy to contain the systemic
risk of European banks between 2000 and 2017. We use a new database (MaPPED)
collected by experts at the ECB and national central banks with narrative information
on a broad range of instruments which are tracked over their life cycle. Using a dynamic
panel framework at a monthly frequency we assess the impact of macroprudential tools
and their design on the banks’ systemic risk both in the short and the long run. We
furthermore decompose the systemic risk measure in an individual bank risk component
and a systemic linkage component. This is of particular interest because microprudential
policy focuses on the tail risk of an individual bank while macroprudential policy targets
systemic risk by addressing the interlinkages and common exposures across banks. In
general, the announcements of macroprudential policy actions have a downward effect on
bank systemic risk. On average, all banks benefit from macroprudential tools in terms of
their individual risk. We find that credit growth tools and exposure limits exhibit the most
pronounced downward effect on the individual risk component. However, we find evidence
for a risk-shifting effect which is more pronounced for retail-oriented banks. The effects are
heterogeneous across banks with respect to the systemic linkage component. Liquidity
tools and measures aimed at increasing the resilience of banks decrease the systemic
linkage of banks. Moreover, these tools appear to be most effective for distressed banks.
Our results have implications for the optimal design of macroprudential instruments.
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1. Introduction
The 2008 financial crisis made clear that keeping individual financial institutions sound
is not a sufficient condition to ensure financial stability. Risk and contagion in the banking
sector were greatly underestimated and the Lehman episode demonstrated that the failure
of one bank may cause the entire system to become unstable. Against this background,
macroprudential policy tools have gained prominence in tackling the systemic risk of the
banking industry. In contrast to microprudential policy which objective it is to limit bank
idiosyncratic risk, macroprudential policy aims at reducing systemic risk by focusing on
the risk of correlated failures and common exposures (see e.g. Crockett, 2000, Borio,
2003 and Caruana, 2010). After the crisis, a number of measures aimed at containing the
stability of the financial system have been implemented across all countries in Europe.
In this paper we analyse whether macroprudential policy tools are effective in achieving
the ultimate objective of maintaining financial stability in the banking sector by limiting
bank systemic risk. In essence, systemic risk has two dimensions. The time dimension
captures the evolution of risk over time. Banks often behave in a procyclical way which
implies that systemic risk may evolve with the business cycle. The cross-sectional di-
mension captures the interlinkages between banks which could have an impact on the
propagation of shocks through the system. These spillovers typically arise from intercon-
nectedness caused by direct linkages between banks, e.g. through the interbank market,
or by common exposures between banks. The ultimate goal of macroprudential policy is
to mitigate systemic risk in both dimensions. Different tools can be used to achieve these
goals, e.g. introducing countercyclical capital buffers to counter the procyclicality of bank
lending or imposing exposure limits to control the interconnectedness between banks. In
this paper we focus on the cross-sectional dimension of systemic risk and rely on stock
market data to construct a measure of bank systemic risk. The main hypothesis is that
the introduction of macroprudential tools will have a downward effect on bank systemic
risk and that this will be reflected in stock market-based measures of bank systemic risk.
Thus far, the empirical evidence seems to support the use and the effectiveness of
macroprudential policies. Nevertheless, most studies focus on the intermediate goals of
macroprudential policy, i.e. credit growth or real estate prices. However, since contain-
ing systemic risk is the ultimate objective of macroprudential policy, we argue that the
effect of the introduction of policy tools on bank systemic risk needs to be examined
more directly. Moreover, from a policy perspective it is important that policymakers and
supervisors understand the impact of different types of policy tools on bank risk. Second,
while a number of studies focus on the impact of macroprudential policy on credit growth,
it should be noted that not all tools are aimed at constraining the credit cycle but rather
at increasing bank stability, e.g. liquidity rules. Again, this calls for a direct analysis
of the link between different types of tools and bank stability. Third, banks may try to
avoid certain regulations by transferring risk to less regulated parts of the economy, which
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is not captured by measures of credit growth. Yet, since banks maintain links with the
non-bank financial intermediation system, regulatory arbitrage may still be reflected in
market-based measures of bank systemic risk. Fourth, most studies use mixed samples of
emerging and advanced economies, with the emerging countries constituting the largest
part of the sample because there macroprudential policy has historically been used more
frequently. Yet, it is important to establish which macroprudential tools work best in a
given institutional context, therefore we focus on the European Union. Fifth, relatively
few studies investigate the usage and effectiveness of policy tools during the post-crisis
period. Since the increasing prominence of these tools in Europe post-2008, a deeper
investigation is warranted. Finally, estimations of the impact of policy tools invariably
encounter the problem of reverse causality: macroprudential policy tools may be intro-
duced in response to increased credit growth or higher systemic risk. This normally results
in an underestimation of the effectiveness of policy tools (Kuttner and Shim, 2016). The
most widely used method to account for the endogeneity issue is to lag explanatory vari-
ables and to use general method of moments estimation (as in Cerutti et al., 2017, Zhang
and Zoli, 2016 and Claessens et al., 2013). However, as Galati and Moessner (2018) point
out, it is likely that the endogeneity problem is not mitigated in this way. In addition,
most studies estimate models at a low, annual or quarterly, frequency which makes it more
difficult to distinguish macroprudential policies from other policies (Galati and Moessner,
2018). We tackle this issue by using a high-frequency dynamic panel setup, by controlling
for macroeconomic factors that may cause policy tools to be activated, and by carefully
using the available narrative information to distinguish different types of macroprudential
policy tools.
We aim to contribute to the literature by assessing the effectiveness of macroprudential
policy on a sample of European banks. More specifically, we investigate the impact of
macroprudential policy on bank systemic risk, which is the ultimate policy goal rather
than an intermediate objective. As outlined in Bisias et al. (2012) over 30 competing
systemic risk measures have been developed over the past years ranging from network
analysis to macroeconomic and illiquidity indicators. Some of these measures reflect the
aggregate level of systemic risk in the financial system, while others assess the individual
bank’s systemic risk contribution. Since macroprudential tools are directed at banks
and aimed at influencing bank behavior, we estimate bank systemic risk as the bank’s
contribution to systemic risk, using financial market information (see e.g. Billio et al.,
2012, Huang et al., 2012, Acharya et al., 2017, van Oordt and Zhou, 2019 and Adrian
and Brunnermeier, 2016 for different approaches). The use of market data has several
advantages compared to the use of accounting data or aggregate macro-economic variables.
First, it allows us to calculate the cross-sectional, bank-specific, systemic risk contributions
when the market is in the tail of its distribution. Second, market data enable a forward-
looking assessment of bank risk and incorporate the expectations of market participants
2
J
urn
al 
Pre
-pr
oo
f
concerning macroprudential policy tools, including avoidance issues. Third, market data
is available at a high frequency which is not the case for accounting measures. This ensures
that an unexpected increase in a bank’s systemic risk contribution can quickly be identified
and that potential endogeneity issues are mitigated. In this paper we follow Acharya et al.
(2017) and use the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES). Over the past years, the MES has
received a lot of attention by academia and regulators and it has become one of the most
commonly used metrics for systemic risk in the literature. Since we want to disentangle
the effect on individual bank risk and the interlinkage component, we decompose the MES
into two components, capturing individual bank risk and the systemic linkage of the bank
with the financial system, in line with van Oordt and Zhou (2019). This decomposition
is of particular interest to answer our research question because macroprudential policy
is aimed at tackling not only the risk profile of individual financial institutions but also
the correlations and common exposures across institutions (Borio, 2003).
For the construction of a macroprudential index we make use of a new database col-
lected by experts at the ECB and national banks. This MacroPrudential Policies Evalua-
tion Database (MaPPED) contains information on almost 2000 macroprudential actions
taken in 28 member states of the European Union between 1995 and 2017. The database
differs from other databases (for example Cerutti et al. (2017) and Lim et al. (2011)
among others) since it not only indicates the activation of a certain policy tool, but it also
tracks the tool over time by including, for example, changes in the level or the scope of
the tool. Also, where other databases have a rather limited tool coverage, this database
contains information on 53 different types of policy tools. In addition, the database pro-
vides information on both the announcement date and the subsequent enforcement date,
which is of particular interest when using market data. In the spirit of Cerutti et al.
(2017) we construct the macroprudential index as a cumulative sum of measures from
the time they are announced until they are deactivated. In this way, the index reflects
the macroprudential policy stance, where a higher value of the index reflects a tightening
of the macroprudential stance. In contrast to other papers we also adjust the index to
changes in the scope or the level of certain tools. We hypothesize that the announcement
of new tools is more important than announcements concerning a change in the scope
of a tool or whether the tool remains at a certain level. We do this by using different
weights per type of announcement. To assess the effectiveness of different types of tools
we also group tools according to their intermediate objective or include separate tools in
the model.
In terms of contribution, this paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to ex-
plore the effects of macroprudential policy at a high (monthly) frequency in a panel data
setting for listed European banks. Using monthly data at the bank level should alleviate
endogeneity concerns to a maximum degree. Moreover, we focus on the impact on the
banks’ systemic risk, since that is ultimate objective of macroprudential policy. We use a
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narrative approach to carefully construct a macroprudential policy index and we distin-
guish different types of policy tools. Finally, we argue that the impact of policy tools may
differ across bank business models, hence we exploit the variation in bank characteristics
to disentangle these differential effects. The dynamics in the model also allow us to dif-
ferentiate between short and long-run effects and to distinguish macroprudential policy
from other policy actions. Furthermore, we control for time-varying local macroeconomic
shocks by including country-specific control variables that are typically known to be used
as macroprudential policy indicators. To account for global macroeconomic conditions we
include time fixed effects.
The main findings of the paper can be summarized as follows. In general, the an-
nouncements of macroprudential policy actions have a downward effect on bank systemic
risk. Whereas previous studies have documented a moderating effect of macroprudential
measures on bank lending and real estate prices, we confirm that macroprudential policy
is also effective in containing bank systemic risk as assessed by stock market investors.
This is an important finding because lowering systemic bank risk is the ultimate objective
of macroprudential policies. A second finding is that different types of macroprudential
tools in general achieve their designated objectives. We document that borrower-oriented
tools and exposure limits primarily have a beneficial impact on the individual risk compo-
nent of banks. Liquidity tools and measures to increase the resilience of banks are found
to lower the systemic linkage component of bank risk. We also investigate heterogeneous
effects of macroprudential measures across different types of banks. We find that credit
growth tools and exposure limits are found to exhibit the most pronounced downward
effect for retail-oriented banks. However, for retail banks we also observe an increase in
their perceived systemic linkage risk, which we attribute to risk-shifting behavior. Since
lending-oriented tools force these banks to lower their exposures to certain types of coun-
terparties or to disinvest certain types of loans or securities, these banks may shift their
asset composition towards exposures that make them more vulnerable to business cycle
or financial market shocks. In terms of policy, our results call for a careful calibration of
lending-oriented macroprudential restrictions in order to avoid the negative consequences
of risk-shifting behavior. Macroprudential policies appear to be most effective for dis-
tressed banks, i.e. banks with a high ratio of non-performing loans. The finding that
their systemic linkage component decreases significantly more compared to more healthy
banks is a desired policy outcome.
The paper proceeds in the following way. In section 2 we review the extant literature
and develop our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the empirical setup we use to assess
the effectiveness of macroprudential policy. We describe the macroprudential database,
explain the construction of the macroprudential policy index and define our measures of
bank systemic risk. Section 4 presents the data and the selection of the sample. In section
5 we analyze the empirical results and section 6 concludes.
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2. Macroprudential policy and bank systemic risk
In this paper we test the hypothesis that macroprudential policy achieves its objective
to lower the systemic risk of the banking sector. Macroprudential policy comes in various
formats. In general we can distinguish two broad categories of macroprudential tools that
can be classified as borrower-based and bank-based policies. Borrower-based measures
refer to macroprudential instruments that focus on reducing household indebtedness, for
instance loan-to-value and debt-to-income limits. Bank-based macroprudential tools cap-
ture restrictions on financial institutions, such as capital and liquidity regulations, limits
on certain exposures, and changes in provisioning rules. Macroprudential measures are
designed to make banks safer and this outcome should be observable by using market
information. Moreover, we test whether or not the improved risk profile is observable for
both bank individual risk as well as its correlation with the market. Hence, our operational
testable hypothesis is that macroprudential policies are perceived by the stock market to
lower the banks’ individual risk and their systemic linkage. Yet, while macroprudential
measures are intended to lower the banks’ risk profile, banks may engage in regulatory
arbitrage and avoid or circumvent certain measures. These actions may result in increased
risk taking which would adversely affect their perceived risk profile. Hence, the net effect
of macroprudential policy on bank riskiness is ultimately an empirical matter, which we
address.
Considering the existing evidence, it can be noted that the focus of the extant literature
is on the effectiveness of macroprudential policy to curb credit growth and housing prices,
which can be considered as intermediate targets. Only few studies investigate the impact
at the bank level. In the first group of studies, Lim et al. (2011) evaluate the effectiveness of
different macroprudential instruments on credit growth, systemic liquidity, leverage, and
capital flows. They use IMF survey data that contains information on macroprudential
instruments used in 49 countries during a 10-year period from 2000 to 2010. They find
that many of the instruments used are effective in reducing the procyclicality. Shim et al.
(2013) investigate the impact of macroprudential tools on housing credit and housing
prices using a database for policy actions on housing markets covering 60 economies
worldwide from 1990 to 2012. The authors find evidence that mainly the debt-service-to-
income requirements and housing-related taxes can be used as tools to restrain housing
credit growth. In contrast, supply-side credit policies such as risk weights and provisioning
requirements had no significant impact on housing credit. Cerutti et al. (2017) use an IMF
survey, Global Macroprudential Policy Instruments (GMPI), to investigate the impact on
18 different policy instruments on credit growth. This dataset covers a sample of 119
countries over the period 2000 to 2013. They find that the policy tools are effective in
reducing credit growth, yet the effects are more pronounced in the emerging economies.
Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2018) use a combination of IMF survey data, BIS data
and information received from national central banks and financial authorities to analyse
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the influence of macro policies on credit growth and housing prices. Using a dynamic
panel setting they find that tightenings in macroprudential tools are associated with
lower credit growth and housing prices. Igan and Kang (2011) make use of a regional
database to examine the effect of loan-to-value and debt-to-income limits on house price
dynamics, residential real estate market activity, and household leverage in Korea. They
find evidence that loan-to-value and debt-to-income tools are indeed associated with both
a decline in house prices and a drop in the number of transactions. Dell’Ariccia et al.
(2016) find that macroprudential tools are effective in reducing the emergence of credit
booms and the costs associated with credit busts. In general, most studies focusing on the
intermediate objectives of macroprudential policy conclude that these policy tools achieve
their stated objective, although some tools appear to be more effective than others.
However, macroprudential policy has a broader objective than restraining credit growth
or housing prices. Prudential policy actions are intended to affect the balance sheet of
financial institutions and in this way also financial stability (Beyer et al., 2017). Also,
some tools are not aimed at curbing the credit cycle but at increasing the resilience and
loss-absorbing capacity of the banks. Therefore, we investigate the heterogeneous effect of
different macroprudential policy tools across different kinds of banks. For example, banks
may respond to a tightening in capital requirements by issuing more equity, by increas-
ing the retained earnings, by deleveraging or de-risking. All of these strategies should
increase the loss absorbing capacity of the bank and create an extra buffer in the case of
unexpected losses. Liquidity-based tools force banks to hold more liquid assets or increase
long-term funding which increases the resilience of banks to unforeseen liquidity shocks.
Banks can also react to tighter liquidity regulations by decreasing their lending portfolio
which also affects their resilience to adverse conditions. All these transmission channels
decrease the banks’ individual risk and potentially also their interconnectedness, which
should limit the occurrence of systemic crises. Borrower-based tools such as loan-to-value
ratios or debt-to-income ratios affect the lending capacity of banks and should reduce the
probability of default of the borrowers, which improves the financial stability of the bank.
Macroprudential tools such as limits on certain exposures or higher risk weights on specific
asset classes impact the loan supply and prevent banks to be sensitive to shocks in, e.g.,
real estate markets. As a consequence, a second strand of the literature has analyzed the
impact of macroprudential policies at the bank-level. For example, Claessens et al. (2013)
evaluate how changes in the banks’ balance sheet correspond to specific macroprudential
policies. They obtain a sample of 2800 banks covering 48 countries over the period 2000
to 2010. Using the same database as in Lim et al. (2011) they find that measures aimed
at borrowers, such as debt-to-income caps and loan-to-value ratios, are most effective in
reducing bank leverage, assets and non-core to core liabilities growth during good times.
Zhang and Zoli (2016) use an event study, macro panel regressions, and micro panel re-
gressions at the bank-level to analyse the effect of macroprudential tools in Asia. They
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find that find that housing-related macroprudential measures are most effective in curbing
house price growth, bank loan growth and bank leverage. Altunbas et al. (2018) provide
evidence based on a large panel of banks operating in 61 advanced and emerging countries.
They find that macroprudential policy is indeed able to decrease bank risk. Moreover, the
impact is dependent on bank-specific characteristics: small, weakly capitalized and more
wholesale funded banks react more strongly to changes in the macroprudential policy
stance.
Yet, the effectiveness of macroprudential policy can be jeopardized by avoidance be-
havior by banks and leakages as well as through unintended consequences in terms of risk
shifting. For example, banks may try to engage in regulatory arbitrage when confronted
with unwanted countercyclical measures or other rules which constrain bank lending or
other revenue-generating financial activities. Moreover, policy strategies to increase the
resilience of the banks could have detrimental effects on their profitability, which could
incentivize banks to undertake activities with a lower regulatory burden. Cerutti et al.
(2017) show that macroprudential policy is associated with relatively greater cross-border
borrowing, suggesting that banks are trying to avoid macroprudential regulations. Rein-
hardt and Sowerbutts (2015) examine the effects of macroprudential regulations on inter-
national banking flows. They find that foreign banks lending to domestic non-banking
sectors increases but only in response to a tightening in the domestic capital regulation
and not following a tightening in the lending standards. Aiyar et al. (2014) find that for-
eign bank branches increase lending when regulation is tightened in the domestic country
because they are excluded from domestic regulation. Next to leakage effects, risk-shifting
effects could arise when banks substitute bank lending by increasing other types of (non-
mortgage) unsecured exposures or by creating new products which can potentially lead
to the build-up of vulnerabilities. Cizel et al. (2016) find evidence of such cross-sector
substitution effects: credit provision shifts from banks towards the non-banking sector
following a tightening in the macroprudential policy stance. Jiménez et al. (2017) use mi-
cro level data of the Spanish credit register and find that banks that are subject to higher
requirements in dynamic provisioning shift their credit supply to riskier firms suggesting
an increase in bank risk taking and a search for yield.
Ultimately, the net effect of prudential policy measures on bank systemic risk depends
on the relative strength of the risk-decreasing versus the risk-shifting effects. Since stock
market investors assess these effects, we rely on market-based measures of bank systemic
risk to assess the perceived effectiveness of macroprudential tools to curb bank risk.
3. Methodology
In order to investigate the effect of macroprudential policy measures on bank systemic
risk, we need three ingredients: (1) set up an appropriate empirical design (section 3.1),
(2) construct an index which adequately captures the stance of macroprudential policy
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in each country (section 3.2), and (3) define our measure of bank systemic risk and its
components (3.3).
3.1. Identification strategy
We assess the market perception of bank risk associated with the introduction of
macroprudential policy measures using a dynamic panel setting as in, e.g. Cerutti et al.
(2017) and Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2018). This specification allows us to identify
the immediate impact as well as the longer-run dynamics. More specifically, we estimate
following dynamic panel regression model at the bank level with a monthly frequency:
Riski,c,t = αi + λRiski,c,t−1 + θMacroPruc,t+
K∑
k=1
βkBankk,i,t +
L∑
l=1
γlMacroControlsl,c,t + δt + εi,c,t (1)
where Riski,c,t represents the (systemic) risk measure and its components of bank i
and MacroPruc,t is the macroprudential index or a group of individual macroprudential
indices in month t for country c that applies for bank i situated in country c. Because
we use financial market data to measure systemic risk measures we construct the macro-
prudential indices on a monthly basis based on the month of the announcement of a tool.
The dependent systemic risk variables are aggregated from daily to monthly frequency so
that they reflect the average risk level over the entire month. If the announcement date
of the tool is not available, we use the enforcement date instead. In line with Akinci and
Olmstead-Rumsey (2018) and Cerutti et al. (2017) we use cumulative measures in the
panel data analysis because macroprudential measures can affect the risk measures not
just in the month of announcement but in subsequent months as well. We hypothesize
that market participants immediately respond to changes in the macroprudential policy
stance in the month of announcement, even before the tool is in force.1 The dynamic
representation allows us to distinguish these short-run (announcement) and longer-run
(enforcement) effects. The short-run impact is given by coefficient θ while the long-run
impact of a permanent increase in the macroprudential index is given by θ
1−λ .
We estimate the baseline specification using different groupings of macroprudential
tools. We estimate the model using the aggregate index where all tools are weighted
equally, but we also group the tools according to their intermediate objective. In order to
gain insight in the relative strength of the tools, we also perform the baseline specification
including the different types of tools separately. Finally, we distinguish tools that have an
explicit countercyclical design from tools that have not. The variable Bank represents a
1Since we are interested in the effect of a macroprudential change on bank systemic risk at the time
of the announcement we estimate the contemporaneous effect rather than the lagged impact because we
assume that the stock market immediately reacts to the macroprudential change. However, when using
the lagged macroprudential index instead of the contemporaneous index the results remain unaltered.
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vector of bank business model characteristics. The MacroControls correspond to macro-
prudential indicators that are most commonly used by the macroprudential authorities
to initiate policy measures.
Given that we estimate this model with a monthly frequency we have a long time
series available. The Nickell bias induced by the presence of the lagged dependent vari-
able converges to zero for a sufficiently large time dimension. Therefore, we can estimate
the model by using the fixed effects estimator. A second issue arises from potential
endogeneity concerns. In essence this means that the macroprudential index not only
consists of exogenous changes but that new measures may be a response to changes in the
macroeconomic environment. An increase in systemic risk, e.g. caused by increasing asset
prices, could trigger the initiation of new macroprudential tools, potentially biasing the
coefficient of interest. However, we have reasons to believe that reverse causality issues
are limited. First, the model is estimated at a high frequency (monthly) which would
imply that macroprudential policy has to respond within the same month to a shock
in systemic risk. However, most policy decisions on the design and implementation of
macroprudential tools take time. Second, the model is estimated with micro (bank level)
data. Macroprudential policy is less likely to respond to individual bank behavior. How-
ever, this statement has to be nuanced, since banks may exhibit similar behavior in some
episodes, which would increase the correlation between banks. Third, we explicitly control
for endogenous changes in the macroprudential index by including macroeconomic and
financial market variables that could trigger the usage of macroprudential policy. First,
we include a variable that reflects stress in the financial markets, namely the composite
indicator of systemic stress (CISS) compiled by the ESRB. When available, we use the
country-level CISS to account for sovereign stress in financial markets. This approach al-
lows us to control for the well-known bank-sovereign feedback loop which was responsible
for a surge in banks’ systemic risk, especially in the vulnerable Eurozone countries (De
Bruyckere et al., 2013). For countries where the sovereign CISS is not available we use
the euro area CISS. Next, we include the changes in bank credit to non-financial corpora-
tions to capture domestic credit growth in each country. To control for developments in
the real estate market we include the year-on-year change in the country-level residential
property price index. In addition, we include country-level GDP growth to account for
economic activity. Finally, there is evidence that accommodating monetary policy can
have an effect on bank risk-taking behavior. For example, Jiménez et al. (2014) find that
a lower monetary policy rate is associated with less capitalized banks granting more loans
to ex ante risky firms and banks diminish the collateral requirements from these firms in
Spain. Heider et al. (2019) find that high-deposit banks lend to riskier firms compared
to low-deposit banks following the introduction of negative monetary policy rates which
could lead to financial vulnerabilities. For this reason, we control for the monetary policy
stance in all European countries by including the corresponding central bank policy rate.
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Variables at a quarterly frequency are converted to monthly data by linear interpolation.
To control for global macroeconomic conditions such as global financial stress we add time
fixed effects to the model. The inclusion of the local macro variables and the time fixed
effects mitigate the concern of an endogeneity issue of the macroprudential index with
respect to the macroeconomic cycle.
As a final effort to avoid endogeneity, we also perform the baseline regressions based
on the narrative information available in the MaPPED database. This is in line with
the identification approach used in Richter et al. (2018) where information on the stated
objectives of policy-makers is used in order to separate policy actions with real objectives
from actions with financial objectives. Since the authors analyze the effect of macropru-
dential tools on output and consumer prices they exclude tools with real objectives. The
MaPPED database constructed by Budnik and Kleibl (2018) is particularly interesting
because it also contains narrative information on the objectives of a certain policy tool.
Respondents to the survey have to indicate whether or not the tools have a countercyclical
design. More specifically, a measure is classified as countercyclical when "its level auto-
matically tightens when systemic risks intensify and loosens when they fade" (Budnik
and Kleibl, 2018). Since the measures designated as countercyclical explicitly refer to
increasing systemic risk and since our estimations assess the relationship between macro-
prudential measures and bank systemic risk, this class of measures is particularly prone
to endogeneity concerns. For this reason, we construct a macroprudential index that is
filtered from countercyclical tools but is only based on tools that enhance the resilience
of banks in an exogenous manner.
In a next step, we introduce heterogeneity across banks since we expect that the
effectiveness of macroprudential measures may be related to the bank business model.
Concretely, we estimate the following panel model using variables at monthly frequency:
Riski,c,t = αi + λRiski,c,t−1 + θMacroPruc,t +
K∑
k=1
ψk
[
MacroPruc,t ×BankFactork,i,t
]
+
K∑
k=1
βkBankFactork,i,t +
M∑
m=1
γmMacroControlsm,c,t−1 + δt + εi,c,t (2)
whereRiski,c,t represents the systemic risk measures and its components, BankFactori,t
is a vector of factors obtained through factor analysis that explain the bank business model
and MacroPruc,t is the macroprudential index of country c in month t. Using this ap-
proach, we allow the impact of macroprudential policy to vary both over banks and over
time, conditioning the effect on the bank’s business model.
The business model characteristics in Banki,t and BankFactori,t are derived from
the banks’ balance sheets and income statements and are intended to capture the asset
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structure, the funding mix, capital adequacy and the income structure of the banks.
However, while our panel analysis is conducted on monthly frequency, bank accounting
data are only available on an annual basis. We therefore replace the value of the business
model variables by their last known value of the previous month, e.g. the value reported
for the end of December 2014 is used for the entire year 2015. By using the last known
value prior to month t we also avoid endogeneity issues as systemic risk and market
valuation may also influence a bank’s business model decisions.
3.2. The macroprudential index
The macroprudential index is constructed based on the MacroPrudential Policies Eval-
uation Database (MaPPED) which has been collected by experts at the ECB and the
national central banks.2 MaPPED provides details on 1925 macroprudential (or similar)
policy actions between 1995 and 2017 in the 28 member states of the European Union.
This database has several advantages compared to existing databases (for example the
IMF database as used in Lim et al. (2011), the BIS database as used in Kuttner and Shim
(2016), the GMPI database as used in Cerutti et al. (2017) and the iMaPP database as
used in Alam et al. (2019)). In contrast to databases that only contain information on the
entering into force of a policy tool, MaPPED provides a detailed life-cycle overview of each
of the policy tools. MaPPED tracks every measure over time, indicating the activation
date but also changes that have been made to the scope or the level of the measure over
time or the deactivation of the measure. Each policy action is classified as a loosening
action, a tightening action or as an action with an ambiguous impact. Also, for every
policy action, the dataset contains information on the nature of the action, for example
whether the measure has a macroprudential or a microprudential nature, whether the tool
has a countercyclical design, or whether the tool targets certain exposures. The tools are
subdivided in 11 separate categories: capital buffers, lending standards, maturity mis-
match tools, limits on credit growth, exposure limits, liquidity rules, loan loss provisions,
minimum capital requirements and risk weights, leverage ratio, and other measures (this
category contains mainly crisis-related measures and resolution tools). An additional ad-
vantage is that the MaPPED survey is designed in such a way that respondents can only
choose from a closed list of policy tools, in contrast to open-text questionnaires as in Lim
et al. (2011) or the GMPI. These features ensure that the comparability across measures
and across countries is maintained which is one of the major drawbacks when using other
existing databases (Budnik and Kleibl, 2018).
We construct our macroprudential index based on the rich set of information that is
available in the MaPPED database. Every tool is characterized by a unique ID code. For
each of these codes the database mentions the ID code for the policy action preceding
2The MaPPED database is publicly available and can be found here:
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/research/working-papers/html/mapped.en.html
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the current action and the ID code of the later action. Based on these ID codes we can
link different policy tools to obtain a view on the life-cycle of every policy action. In
this way the dataset of 1925 separate policy actions reduces to around 850 linked policy
action ’groups’. Next, we identify a weighting scheme, whereby we assign a higher weight
to policy actions we consider to be more important. Given the large variation within the
different categories of policy instruments we opt to only quantify changes in the policy
tool over time rather than across policy types, as in Vandenbussche et al. (2015) or Richter
et al. (2018). For example, changes in the level of a tool receive a higher weight than
changes in the definition of a tool. First time activations receive the highest weight. A
tightening policy action is attributed with a positive value, while a loosening action is
given a negative value. When the tool has an ambiguous impact, we assign a value of
zero. Equally, if no action was taken in a specific quarter, we assign a value of zero to
the index. Finally, we adjust the weight of the deactivation of a tool to the number of
adjustments the specific tool encountered during its life-cycle. In other words, when a
tool is deactivated the cumulative index for the tool drops to zero.
Type of action Weight Loosening/tightening Impact Final weight
(Weight x impact)
Activation of a tool
Policy tightening 1 1
1 Other/ambiguous impact 0 0
Policy loosening -1 -1
Change in the level of Policy tightening 1 0.25
an existing tool 0.25 Other/ambiguous impact 0 0
Policy loosening -1 -0.25
Change in the scope of Policy tightening 1 0.1
an existing tool 0.1 Other/ambiguous impact 0 0
Policy loosening -1 -0.1
Maintaining the existing Policy tightening 1 0.05
level and scope of a tool 0.05 Other/ambiguous impact 0 0
Policy loosening -1 -0.05
Deactivation of a tool Dependent on the life cycle
Table 1: Weighting scheme to construct the life cycle of a policy action over time. Policy actions are weighted according
to their relative importance. Figure 1 gives an example based on the weights displayed in this table.
Table 1 gives an overview of the weights that are used to construct the life-cycle index
for every tool separately. As a typical example, figure 1 shows the build-up of policy
actions over time of a loan loss provisioning rule in Romania. The tool is activated
in February 1994, hence the index goes up by 1. In April 1999 and in August 2002
a tightening in the classification standards is introduced which induces an increase in
the index with 0.10. In September 2005 the provisioning level is increased for loans to
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households which leads to an increase of the index by 0.25. At the end of 2006 the index
jumps with 0.10 as the scope of the tool is extended because more entities are now required
to apply. In 2008 the coefficients are raised for a second time inducing an increase of the
index with 0.25. When the legal framework is relaxed in March 2009, the index goes down
by 0.10. In September 2011 the tool is deactivated which means that the index goes down
by 1.70, which is the cumulative sum of all policy actions over the life time of the tool.
At that point in time, the index falls back to zero.
01-1993 01-1997 01-2001 01-2005 01-2009
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
↑
Introduction of
provisioning rules ↑
More stringent rules ↑
Recasting of legal framework ↑
Level of provisions raised ↑
Extended scope ↑
Raise of provisioning coefficients
↓
Relaxation in
legal framework
↓
Deactivation
-1.70
-0.10+0.25
+0.25
+0.10
+0.10
+0.10
+1
Figure 1: Illustrative example of how the macroprudential index is constructed. The graph shows the
build-up of a loan-loss provisioning tool that was announced at the beginning of 1994 in Romania. At
that point in time the index increases with 1. Changes in the scope which tighten the tool increase the
index by 0.10. Changes in the level that have a tightening effect push the index up by 0.25. Loosening
policy actions are assigned a similar weight but have a downward impact on the index. The deactivation
brings the index back to zero meaning that the weight is dependent on the life cycle of the tool.
After we reconstruct the life-cycle of the 850 policy tools in a similar way, we obtain
an aggregate macroprudential index that reflects the macroprudential policy stance in a
certain country. We sum all categories, giving an equal weight to all tools. We acknowl-
edge that an equal weight may not be appropriate since some tools are more effective than
others, but we address this by estimating the baseline specifications by regrouping the
tools in narrower categories according to their objective or by including tools separately
in the model. More specifically, we investigate the impact of lending standard restric-
tions which incorporate loan-to- value ratios, loan-to-income ratios, debt-serve-to-income
ratios and maturity and amortization restrictions. Next to this we analyze the effect of
risk weights on mortgage loans and commercial loans. The lending standard restrictions
and sectoral risk weights are both tools aimed at restraining credit growth. Next to this
we also account for liquidity regulations. These tools cover the initiation of liquidity
coverage ratios, net stable funding ratios, loan-to-deposit ratios, and other liquidity re-
quirements. As a separate category we include the exposure limits as a policy tool which
comprises single client exposure limits, intragroup exposure limits and sector and market
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segment exposure limits among others. Lastly, we bundle the categories that impact mis-
aligned incentives in the banking sector. In particular, we examine the effect of minimum
capital requirements (mainly the regulations under the CRR/CRD framework), capital
buffers (systemic risk buffers, countercyclical buffers, capital conservation buffers), taxes
on financial institutions and loan loss provisioning rules. The category other tools is a
mixture of crisis management tools, debt resolution policies and changes in the regulatory
framework.
3.3. Bank systemic risk
Over the past years various measures for systemic risk have been developed. Bisias
et al. (2012) provide an extensive overview of the most commonly used measures rang-
ing from network analysis to illiquidity indicators. A broad range of these measures is
based on financial market data. A commonly used approach is to model systemic risk
as the contribution of a bank to systemwide stress using financial market data. One of
the most frequently used measures for systemic risk is the Marginal Expected Shortfall
(MES) by Acharya et al. (2017) which is calculated as the expected loss of a bank’s stock
price conditional on a large shock to the financial system. While the purpose of these
measures is to rank banks in the cross-sectional dimension in terms of their individual risk
profile, a feature which is relevant to our research questions is that the MES of a bank
can be decomposed in an idiosyncratic risk component and a component capturing the
interconnectedness of the bank. This feature makes the approach particularly relevant for
policymakers: while microprudential policy is aimed at constraining the bank’s individual
risk, macroprudential policy focuses on common exposures and correlations across banks
(Borio, 2003).
First, we model the bivariate process of bank and market returns in line with Brownlees
and Engle (2017):
ri,t = σi,tρi,tεm,t + σi,t
√
1− ρ2i,tξi,t (3)
rm,t = σm,tεm,t (4)
ri,t and rm,t are the bank and market return, respectively. As the market return
we use the MSCI Europe. σm,t and σi,t are the volatilities of the market and the bank
i at time t respectively. ρi,t is the correlation between ri,t and rm,t at time t. The
disturbances (εm,t,ξi,t) are assumed to be independently and identically distributed over
time and have zero mean and a unit variance. We can write the MES more explicitly as a
function of correlation, volatility and the tail expectations of the standardized innovations
distributions:3
3To estimate the different components of the MES we follow Brownlees and Engle (2017) and Idier
et al. (2014). We explain the estimation procedure in more detail in appendix 1.
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MESi,t = Et−1(ri,t|rm,t < C) (5)
= σi,tρi,tEt−1
(
εm,t|εm,t < C
σm,t
)
+ σi,t
√
1− ρ2i,tEt−1
(
ξi,t|εm,t < C
σm,t
)
(6)
The MES measures a bank’s expected equity loss when the market falls below a certain
threshold over a given horizon. In line with Acharya et al. (2012), the threshold C that
defines a crisis is set at a -2% loss in the relevant market index over a one-day period.
We make the assumption that the dependence between bank and market returns is fully
captured by the time-varying conditional correlations ρi,t. This assumption implies that
the standardized innovations ξi,t and εm,t are assumed to be independently distributed at
time t. More specifically, Et−1
(
ξi,t|εm,t < Cσm,t
)
and thus the second part of the sum is
zero. The MES now simplifies to:
MESi,t = σi,tρi,tEt−1
(
εm,t|εm,t < C
σm,t
)
(7)
=
σi,t
σm,t
ρi,tEt−1 (rm,t|rm,t < C) (8)
=
σi,t
σm,t
ρi,tESm,t (9)
ESm,t denotes the Expected Shortfall of the market and reflects the expected loss of
the market when the market experiences a large shock greater than threshold C. We can
see that the MES is proportional to the dynamic βi,t:
MESi,t = βi,tESm,t (10)
where βi,t =
cov(ri,t)
var(rm,t)
= ρi,t
σi,t
σm,t
denotes the time-varying conditional beta for bank i at
time t and ESm,t is the expected shortfall of the market. The expected shortfall of the
return on the financial system, ESm,t, is invariant across banks i which implies that the
dispersion in the MES can only be attributed to cross-sectional differences in βi,t. If we
take the logarithmic transformation we can write the following expression:
log(
MESi,t
ESm,t
) = log(βi,t) = log(
σi,t
σm,t
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Individual risk (IR)
+ log(ρi,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Systemic linkage (SL)
(11)
We can now see that changes in the MES and the dynamic beta are determined by
changes in the time-varying correlation with the market ρi,t and changes in the standard
deviation of the bank relative to the standard deviation of the market σi,t
σm,t
. These terms
are in line with the ’systemic linkage’ component (SL) and the ’individual risk’ (IR)
component as described in van Oordt and Zhou (2019) so we decide to adopt the same
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names for both components. Notice that for the decomposition of the MES we make the
assumption that there are no tail dependencies. However, in the regression analysis we
calculate the MES as shown in equation 6 and we relax the assumption of independent
market and bank returns. More specifically, we assume that the dependence between
financial asset returns is not linear. This means that tail dependencies can occur: when
the market is in its tail, the bank disturbances may be even further in the tail if there
is serious risk of default (Brownlees and Engle, 2017). We can show, however, that the
variation in the MES is mainly explained by variation in the first part of equation 6 and
that the second part of equation 6 is close to zero. For this reason, the results of the
regressions using the MES and beta as dependent variables will yield different, yet very
similar results since the time fixed effects absorb all variation in the ES-component.
This decomposition is of particular interest for our research. More specifically, mi-
croprudential regulation focuses on banks’ individual tail risk, while macroprudential
regulation also takes correlations and common exposures across institutions into account.
This decomposition allows us to assess whether or not macroprudential policy actions
impact the systemic risk of the banks by affecting their individual risk, their interlinkage
with the market, or both, as perceived by the stock market. In the regression analysis we
therefore estimate the impact of macroprudential policy on 4 response variables: the two
subcomponents of dynamic beta, IR and SL, the dynamic beta itself, and the MES.
4. Data and sample selection
To conduct our analysis we require both financial market and accounting data for a
set of listed European banks. We obtain annual balance sheet and income statement data
from Bankscope and daily stock return data from Datastream, which are linked based
on the ISIN codes. We limit the sample to banks of which the Bankscope specialization
is bank holding company, commercial bank, cooperative bank, investment bank or real
estate and mortgage bank. We furthermore exclude financial holding companies that
are not engaged in banking activity (e.g., asset management companies, online brokers or
insurance companies). To achieve this we filter out banks that have a loans-to-assets ratio
and a deposits-to-liabilities ratio lower than 20%. In addition, we manually drop domestic
subsidiary banks (e.g., the listed regional branches of the French bank Crédit Agricole).
Because the systemic risk measures are estimated on a daily frequency we require that the
stocks in our analysis are liquidly traded by imposing that at least 65% of returns are non-
zero during the sample period. We use the accounting data to construct a set of business
model variables to capture the asset, liability and income structure of the banks as in
Mergaerts and Vander Vennet (2016). We measure a bank’s asset structure by defining
variables that capture the composition of earning assets (the loan ratio, LTA) and the
quality of the loan portfolio (the proportion of non-performing loans in total loans, NPL).
We use the ratio of customer deposits to total liabilities (DEP) and an unweighted capital
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ratio, i.e. the ratio of total equity to total assets (CAP), to capture banks’ funding and
capital structure. As an indicator for the banks’ income structure, we use the share of
non-interest income in total income (DIV) as a proxy for revenue diversification. Bank
profitability is captured by the pre-tax income divided by total assets (ROA). We also
include bank size, measured by total assets, as a control variable. Note that all variables
have been winsorized at the 1% level.
The macro control variables described in section 3 (Methodology) are retrieved from
the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse (SDW) and Datastream. Quarterly series are trans-
formed into monthly series using linear interpolation techniques. After the application of
the data selection procedure and the matching with the macroprudential variables and
the bank characteristics our bank sample covers 113 European banks across 21 countries
resulting in 15686 bank-month observations. The sample of banks is displayed in the
appendix. Descriptive statistics can be found in table 2.
Variable Unit Mean Std. Dev Min. Max. N Source
Systemic risk measures
Individual risk 2.33 1.22 0.51 7.69 15,686 Datastream
Systemic linkage % 41.39 22.54 0.05 83.04 15,686 Datastream
Beta 0.94 0.63 0.001 2.79 15,686 Datastream
MES % 2.45 1.65 0.001 7.35 15,686 Datastream
PD bps 2.78 1.44 0.58 8.30 13,402 CRI/MRI/NUS
CDS bps 177.29 259.97 5.94 1,519.59 5,991 Markit
VaR % 3.51 2.02 0.92 12.25 15,686 Datastream
CoVaR 0.72 0.57 0.0004 2.75 15,686 Datastream
Bank specific characteristics
LTA % 57.30 14.57 10.33 91.03 15,686 Bankscope
NPL % 4.44 4.35 0.15 25.52 15,686 Bankscope
CAP % 7.63 3.75 1.38 28.46 15,686 Bankscope
SIZE 17.47 2.25 11.38 21.14 15,686 Bankscope
ROA % 0.64 1.49 -16.48 12.61 15,686 Bankscope
DIV % 39.85 14.43 2.94 99.74 15,686 Bankscope
DEP % 52.45 17.11 15.72 89.21 15,686 Bankscope
Macroprudential policy rule variables
Loan growth % 4.60 8.76 -20.00 64.00 15,686 SDW: MFI loans to NFC (yoy \% change)
GDP growth % 1.45 3.02 -10.30 29.35 15,686 Real GDP growth (yoy \% change)
HPI growth 3.15 8.96 -27.00 81.00 15,686 OECD, Eurostat and NCB’s (yoy \% change)
CISS 0.21 0.22 0.01 0.99 15,686 SDW: Systemic Stress Composite Indicator
Central bank policy rate % 1.76 1.64 -0.50 11.50 15,686 Policy rate of the corresponding central bank
Macroprudential index
MacroPru 4.18 6.23 -9.35 22.60 15,686 MAPPED
Lending standards 0.96 3.12 -5.60 11.55 15,686 MAPPED
Sectoral risk weights 0.46 0.76 -1.00 2.60 15,686 MAPPED
Credit limits -0.44 2.07 -8.25 1.00 15,686 MAPPED
Liquidity tools 0.97 1.68 -1.25 9.00 15,686 MAPPED
Exposure limits 0.04 1.43 -3.15 4.00 15,686 MAPPED
Minimum capital 0.88 1.26 -0.90 7.10 15,686 MAPPED
Capital buffers 0.62 1.03 -1.00 4.25 15,686 MAPPED
Tax 0.31 0.72 -1.00 2.50 15,686 MAPPED
Provisioning rules 0.09 0.53 -3.30 3.00 15,686 MAPPED
Other 0.25 0.69 -2.25 7.55 15,686 MAPPED
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
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In order to gain insight in the association between bank business models and the bank
systemic risk components we use in our empirical analysis, table 3 exhibits the association
between 7 bank characteristics and the four risk components: individual risk and systemic
linkage, the dynamic beta and the MES. More specifically, we compare the characteristics
of low-risk banks (lowest quartile) with those of the high-risk banks (highest quartile).
For each comparison we calculate the corresponding t-value, indicating the significance
of the difference. The higher the absolute value of the t-value, the more distinct the
banks are in that dimension. For the individual risk component, the main discriminating
variables are the non-performing loan ratio NPL and the banks’ profitability ROA. This
confirms the finding by van Oordt and Zhou (2019) that the individual risk measure is
closely related to the probability of default of the bank. As a result, we can expect that
macroprudential tools that are aimed at improving the credit risk of the bank, such as
loan loss provisioning tools or borrower related tools that increase the resilience of banks
by improving the collateral and by decreasing the debt levels of borrowers, will have the
largest impact on the individual tail risk of the bank. Notwithstanding the finding that
NPL and ROA are the most significant discriminators between high and low-risk banks,
the stock market also significantly attributes a lower IR to banks characterized by a higher
degree of revenue diversification, most likely because these banks are less vulnerable to
persistently low interest rates. The systemic linkage component captures the correlation
of the bank with the market and hence its interconnectedness. In accordance with van
Oordt and Zhou (2019) and López-Espinosa et al. (2013) we find that high values for
the systemic linkage component of the bank is associated with a larger bank size and
with the funding structure of the bank. A bank characterized by a lower deposit funding
ratio is to a larger extent financed with market-based funding sources such as interbank
loans which are more interest rate sensitive. Larger banks and banks with a less stable
funding base are thus more interconnected with the system. We hypothesize that liquidity
regulation and capital buffers aimed at improving the resilience of systemically important
banks will have a beneficial impact on the systemic linkage of the banks. Next to the
funding structure and the size of the bank, more systemically linked banks have a smaller
loan portfolio, are characterized by fewer non-performing loans, have a lower capital ratio,
are more diversified in their income sources and have a slightly lower profitability. The
correlations of the bank business model factors related to the dynamic beta and the MES
are similar to the correlations of the business model characteristics with the systemic
linkage component, indicating the the systemic risk measures are predominantly driven
by the systemic linkage of the bank.
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IR SL Beta MES LTA NPL DEP CAP DIV SIZE ROA
Individual risk (IR)
25% lowest IR banks 1.27 32.64% 0.44 1.14% 58.93% 3.54% 55.10% 8.24% 38.73% 16.69 1.13%
se 0.29 0.23 0.34 0.01 0.13 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.14 2.48 0.01
25% highest IR banks 4.26 31.33% 1.29 3.37% 59.31% 6.75% 57.41% 7.95% 36.21% 16.77 0.10%
se 1.34 0.21 0.84 0.02 0.14 0.06 0.18 0.04 0.14 2.47 0.02
Difference -3.00 1.30% -0.86 -2.22% -0.38% -3.21% -2.31% 0.29% 2.52% -8.43% 1.02%
T-value -45.30 0.86 -19.41 -19.75 -0.42 -10.38 -1.92 1.08 2.58 -0.50 8.91
Systemic linkage (SL)
25% lowest SL banks 2.49 7.79% 0.20 0.76% 59.70% 6.23% 67.46% 10.09% 36.07% 14.39 0.90%
se 1.50 0.04 0.23 0.01 0.13 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.15 1.87 0.02
25% highest SL banks 2.25 65.77% 1.45 3.69% 51.07% 2.90% 41.03% 5.71% 43.16% 19.47 0.71%
se 0.86 0.08 0.51 0.01 0.17 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.14 1.37 0.01
Difference -0.25 57.98% 1.25 2.93% -8.62% -3.33% -26.44% -4.38% 7.09% 5.08 -0.19%
T-value 2.96 -131.64 -46.18 -36.85 8.29 11.74 27.81 18.06 -7.22 -45.25 2.14
Beta
25% lowest Beta banks 1.92 9.44% 0.15 0.57% 59.91% 5.28% 65.40% 9.89% 36.61% 14.62 1.10%
se 1.02 0.07 0.09 0.01 0.12 0.04 0.16 0.04 0.15 1.96 0.01
25% highest Beta banks 3.43 57.31% 1.78 4.38% 53.81% 4.72% 44.65% 6.22% 40.04% 19.00 0.22%
se 1.54 0.16 0.46 0.01 0.16 0.04 0.14 0.03 0.16 1.58 0.02
Difference -1.51 -47.87% -1.63 -3.82% 6.22% 0.58% 20.75% 3.69% -3.32% -4.40 0.90%
T-value -16.89 -58.18 -71.94 -51.67 6.23 1.91 20.37 14.46 -3.20 -36.09 8.79
MES
25% lowest MES banks 1.88 11.85% 0.20 0.38% 60.13% 5.02% 64.67% 9.66% 36.88% 14.81 1.16%
se 1.00 0.09 0.18 0.00 0.13 0.04 0.16 0.04 0.14 2.02 0.01
25% highest MES banks 3.38 54.62% 1.67 4.57% 53.70% 4.64% 45.90% 6.36% 40.37% 18.71 0.30%
se 1.58 0.18 0.56 0.01 0.16 0.05 0.15 0.03 0.15 1.89 0.02
Difference -1.50 -42.77% -1.46 -4.19% 6.43% 0.38% 18.77% 3.30% -3.49% -3.90 0.86%
T-value -16.57 -43.92 -51.66 -73.37 6.45 1.24 17.76 12.95 -3.52 -29.18 8.41
Table 3: Comparison of the individual risk, systemic linkage, beta and MES with bank business model characteristics.
A low-risk bank has an average individual risk/systemic linkage/beta/MES in the lowest quartile of the distribution; a
high-risk bank an average individual risk/systemic linkage/beta/MES in the highest quartile.
5. Results
In this section we assess the impact of the announcement of a tightening in the macro-
prudential policy stance on European banks’ systemic risk and its components. Subsection
5.1 reports and discusses the results of the baseline regression analysis. Subsection 5.2
investigates the heterogeneous impact of macroprudential policy across different bank
business models using interaction effects. In subsection 5.3 we investigate the robustness
of the results and use alternative measures for bank systemic risk as well as alternative
ways to calculate the macroprudential index.
5.1. Baseline results
We examine whether or not stock market investors associate the announcements of
macroprudential measures in a country with a decrease in the risk profile of the affected
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banks. Bank risk is captured by considering the systemic risk (MES), which in turn is
determined by the banks’ dynamic beta (beta) and this metric can be further subdivided
in an individual risk component (IR) and a systemic linkage component (SL). Table 4
shows the results of the baseline regression as displayed in equation 1.
IR SL Beta MES IR SL Beta MES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lagged dependent 0.745*** 0.712*** 0.744*** 0.689*** 0.746*** 0.712*** 0.744*** 0.688***
(0.011) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.011) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016)
MacroPru (all tools) -0.006*** 0.001 -0.005*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
MacroPru (ex countercyclical) -0.006*** -0.0003 -0.006*** -0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
SIZE 0.028*** 0.016 0.041*** 0.053*** 0.027*** 0.015 0.039*** 0.051***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.016) (0.008) (0.010) (0.014) (0.016)
LTA -0.054* -0.028 -0.067 -0.035 -0.049 -0.031 -0.066 -0.036
(0.031) (0.037) (0.048) (0.077) (0.031) (0.037) (0.048) (0.076)
DEP -0.037 -0.031 -0.068 0.003 -0.038 -0.031 -0.069 0.003
(0.028) (0.037) (0.048) (0.076) (0.028) (0.036) (0.048) (0.076)
NPL 0.453*** -0.340*** 0.182 0.261 0.445*** -0.362*** 0.155 0.205
(0.090) (0.095) (0.147) (0.190) (0.090) (0.094) (0.146) (0.188)
DIV -0.006 0.029 0.024 0.005 -0.010 0.028 0.019 -0.003
(0.022) (0.028) (0.037) (0.045) (0.021) (0.028) (0.036) (0.045)
CAP -0.364** 0.639*** 0.269 0.555 -0.353** 0.647*** 0.286 0.585*
(0.170) (0.187) (0.257) (0.344) (0.167) (0.187) (0.256) (0.344)
ROA -0.158 0.255 -0.146 -0.323 -0.181 0.262 -0.173 -0.348
(0.228) (0.253) (0.354) (0.458) (0.223) (0.252) (0.353) (0.460)
CISS 0.114*** 0.056*** 0.164*** 0.202*** 0.110*** 0.054*** 0.159*** 0.196***
(0.021) (0.018) (0.028) (0.036) (0.021) (0.017) (0.028) (0.037)
House price growth 0.001*** -0.000 0.001* 0.124** 0.001*** -0.000 0.001** 0.125**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.054) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.053)
GDP growth -0.003** 0.005*** 0.002 -0.000 -0.003** 0.005*** 0.002 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Credit growth -0.002*** 0.001*** -0.001 -0.001** -0.002*** 0.001*** -0.001 -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Policy rate -0.002 0.016*** 0.013** 0.020*** -0.002 0.016*** 0.013** 0.020***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
R2 (within) 0.780 0.629 0.680 0.637 0.780 0.629 0.680 0.637
Obs 15686
Banks 113
Sample period 2000-2017
Time fixed effects Yes
Estimated long-run effect -2.35% 0.35% -1.95% -1.93% -2.36% 0.00% -2.34% -2.56%
Table 4: Baseline regression results based on equation 1 in which we estimate the effect of macroprudential policy on bank
systemic risk (beta/MES) and its components (IR/SL), including bank and macro control variables. In columns 1 tot 4
the macroprudential index contains all tools, equally weighted. In columns 5 to 8 the index excludes endogenous tools that
are marked as "countercyclical" in the MaPPED database. The partial adjustment model is estimated using bank fixed
effects. The coefficient on the macroprudential index represents the short run impact θ, the long run impact is reflected
by θ
1−λ as represented in equation 1 and as shown in the bottom row of this table. Time fixed effects are also included in
the model. Standard errors are the Driscoll Kraay standard errors which are robust to general forms of cross-sectional and
temporal dependence when the time dimension becomes large. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively.
We estimate the immediate short-run impact (captured by the coefficient on the
MacroPru index) as well as the long-run impact (reported in the bottom row of table
4). The dependent variables are expressed in logarithmic scale so that we can interpret
the coefficients as percentages, which allows us to quantify how macroprudential policies
impact the components of bank systemic risk. First, we estimate the model using the
aggregate macroprudential index, whereby all tools are equally weighted. A unit increase
in the macroprudential index, which corresponds to a tightening of the macroprudential
policy stance, is found to have a significant immediate impact of -0.60% on the MES, trans-
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lating into a long-term impact of -1.93%. With respect to the economic significance of the
results, the estimated impact is almost 1.5 times larger than the average monthly change
in the MES. The beta of the banks is found to drop by 1.95% in the long run. This result
indicates that, on average for all banks, macroprudential policy announcements have a
beneficial effect on the banks’ perceived systemic risk. Considering the components of the
beta, we find that the IR component exhibits a downward effect of 0.6% in the short-run
and a long-run impact of -2.35%. In economic terms, this estimated impact is almost 3
times larger than the average monthly change in the IR component. The impact on the
systemic linkage component is however found to be insignificant. While we will further
demonstrate that this negligible overall effect hides substantial heterogeneity across types
of banks, our main finding is that macroprudential policy announcements are associated
with a downward effect on the banks’ systemic risk, but the risk reduction is primarily
due to a perceived decrease in their individual risk, not their systemic linkage with the
financial sector. In a second specification shown in table 4 we use the narrative informa-
tion in the MaPPED database and construct a macroprudential index excluding all those
tools that are reported as designed as countercyclical by the survey respondents. Leaving
out the explicit countercyclical tools helps us to control for the endogenous response of
macroprudential policy to the assessment of the systemic risk level in the economy by the
macroprudential authorities. The results are similar compared to the specification which
uses the index based on all tools (although the long-term impact on the MES is found to
be somewhat larger, at -2.56%).
The macroprudential index contains a mix of tools with varying objectives. In table
5 we analyze whether the effectiveness of the tools depends on the design of the different
types of policy actions. We split the tools into subindices based on their design features
described in the MaPPED database and we assess their impact on the individual risk
component (IR), the systemic linkage component (SL), dynamic beta and the MES. First,
we compare general tools with tools that are targeted to certain exposures, for example real
estate exposures. This mainly captures borrower-related tools such as loan-to-value ratios
or exposure limits. Second, we investigate whether or not there is a difference between
measures that are classified in MaPPED as legally binding versus only recommended.
Third, we divide the macroprudential index in an index comprising those tools that are
followed by hard sanctions in case of non-compliance and an index of tools which are
not associated with sanctions. Finally, we compare tools where the enforcement date
equals the announcement date with tools that are enforced with a considerable time lag
of 12 months or more following the announcement date. The coefficients represent the
long-run effect associated with a tightening in the index. The general finding in table 5
is that all tools are associated with a downward effect on individual bank risk, although
the magnitude of the perceived impact differs somewhat across types of policy actions.
The perceived risk reduction is however less present, or even absent, for the systemic
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linkage component of bank risk, confirming the findings of table 4. In terms of policy
effectiveness as judged by stock market investors, the targeted measures outperform the
general measures with respect to their perceived impact on individual bank risk (-4.2%
versus 0.7%, in the long run). The other subdivisions appear less discriminatory, they all
exhibit a downward effect on the banks’ IR component, although it appears to be most
pronounced for targeted, legally binding tools associated with hard sanctions in case of
non-compliance and tools that are enforced immediately after the announcement. Our
finding that targeted measures produce the most significant downward effect on banks’ IR
is not unexpected since they are explicitly aimed at limiting well defined exposures that are
deemed by the macroprudential authorities to potentially cause excessive risk. Finally,
we fail to find evidence indicating that macroprudential actions decrease the systemic
linkage component of bank systemic risk. In the case of targeted measures, the effect
is even positive, indicating that these measures are perceived to contain bank individual
risk, but not systemic linkages caused by interconnectedness.
IR SL Beta IR SL Beta IR SL Beta IR SL Beta
(1) (2) (3) (5) (6) (7) (9) (10) (11) (13) (14) (15)
Lagged dependent 0.742*** 0.711*** 0.744*** 0.745*** 0.712*** 0.744*** 0.744*** 0.711*** 0.744*** 0.747*** 0.712*** 0.744***
(0.011) (0.018) (0.017) (0.011) (0.018) (0.017) (0.011) (0.018) (0.017) (0.011) (0.018) (0.017)
Targeted measure -0.042*** 0.021*** -0.023***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
General measure -0.007 -0.010* -0.019**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Legally binding -0.023*** 0.003 -0.023***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Recommended -0.019*** 0.003 -0.019**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Hard sanctions -0.027*** 0.007 -0.019***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
No hard sanctions -0.015** -0.006* -0.023***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Announcement = -0.027*** -0.006 -0.035***
enforcement (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Enforcement 12m -0.015** 0.007 -0.007
after announcement (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
R2 (within) 0.780 0.629 0.680 0.780 0.629 0.680 0.780 0.629 0.680 0.780 0.629 0.681
Obs 15686
Banks 113
Sample period 2000-2017
Time fixed effects yes
Bank variables yes
Macro variables yes
Table 5: Baseline regression results based on equation 1 in which we estimate the effect of macroprudential policy on
bank systemic risk (beta/MES) and its subcomponents (IR/SL) but with the index broken down according to different
design features of macroprudential policy. We distinguish between targeted/general measures, legally binding/recommended
measures, hard/no hard sanctions in case of non-compliance and measures that are announced and enforced in the same
month versus tools that are enforced after 12 month or more after the announcement. The partial adjustment model is
estimated using bank fixed effects. The coefficients on the macroprudential index and the subcategories represent the long-
run coefficients as measured in equation 1 by θ
1−λ . Time fixed effects are also included in the model. Standard errors are
the Driscoll Kraay standard errors which are robust to general forms of cross-sectional and temporal dependence when the
time dimension becomes large. Control variables are omitted from the regression table to save space. *, **, *** represent
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
The next step in our analysis is to move beyond general indices and dig deeper into
the effects of macroprudential actions based on their stated economic objectives. In table
6 we explore the association between different types of macroprudential tools and bank
risk. Columns (1) to (4) of table 6 repeat the baseline results from table 4, for comparison
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purposes. In columns (5) to (8) we construct an index based on 4 types of macroprudential
tools that have the same intermediate objective according to the ESRB classification:
policy actions related to (1) credit growth, (2) liquidity, (3) exposure concentration and
(4) bank resilience or tackling misaligned incentives.
IR SL Beta MES IR SL Beta MES IR SL Beta MES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Lagged dependent 0.745*** 0.712*** 0.744*** 0.689*** 0.743*** 0.709*** 0.743*** 0.688*** 0.741*** 0.706*** 0.740*** 0.687***
(0.011) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.011) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.011) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
MacroPru -0.023*** 0.003 -0.019*** -0.019***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Credit growth -0.038*** 0.017*** -0.023** -0.012
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Lending standards -0.042*** 0.007 -0.034*** -0.015
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Sectoral risk weights -0.019 0.0170 -0.003 -0.003
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
Credit limits 0.0154 0.007 0.027 0.067
(0.011) (0.017) (0.016) (0.032)
Market liquidity -0.011 -0.024* -0.038** -0.038*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
Liquidity tools -0.023* -0.034*** -0.061*** -0.051**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Concentration -0.023* 0.034*** 0.008 -0.0003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
Exposure limits -0.030** 0.044*** 0.012 -0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007)
Resilience tools -0.011 -0.013* -0.027*** -0.022**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Minimum capital 0.0115 0.031* 0.046 0.022
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009)
Capital buffers 0.000 0.003 0.008 -0.009
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008)
Tax -0.046** -0.013 -0.053 -0.057
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013)
Provisioning rules 0.0810*** -0.013 0.0692 0.096
(0.008) (0.011) (0.015) (0.027)
Other tools -0.011 -0.081** -0.107*** -0.057
(0.006) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012)
R2 (within) 0.780 0.629 0.680 0.637 0.781 0.630 0.681 0.637 0.781 0.631 0.681 0.637
Obs 15686
Banks 113
Sample period 2000-2017
Time fixed effects yes
Bank variables yes
Macro variables yes
Table 6: Baseline regression results based on equation 1. In this table we subdivide the macroprudential index in more
narrow subcategories in order to assess their impact on the systemic risk measures (beta/MES) and their subcomponents
(IR/SL). Columns 1 to 4 represent the estimations using the aggregate index, columns 5-8 split the aggregate index in
subcategories according to their intermediate objective and columns 9-12 represent the separate tools. The model is
estimated using bank fixed effects. Time fixed effects are also included in the model. The coefficients on the macroprudential
index and the subcategories represent the long-run coefficients as measured in equation 1 by θ
1−λ . Standard errors are
the Driscoll Kraay standard errors which are robust to general forms of cross-sectional and temporal dependence when the
time dimension becomes large. Control variables are omitted from the regression table to save space. *, **, *** represent
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
In all the specifications in table 6 we directly report the long-run effect measured by
θ
1−λ . Focusing on the findings for this classification of tools, we find that credit growth
policies, liquidity tools and bank resilience tools are most effective in containing bank
systemic risk, measured by the MES or the dynamic beta. The long-run impacts vary
from a downward perceived risk shift of -2.2% (resilience tools) to -3.8 (liquidity tools).
Tracing the causes of the decline in systemic risk to individual risk versus systemic linkage,
we observe that credit growth tools and exposure concentration tools have the most
pronounced downward effect on individual bank risk. Again, this can be explained by the
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fact that these tools are intended to specifically address excessive risk taken by individual
banks, e.g. accumulating exposures to overheating real estate markets. However, these
two types of tools are also associated with an increase in perceived systemic linkage risk,
since stock market investors consider them ineffective to address the interconnectedness
issue. We do find a downward impact on the SL component from market liquidity tools
and tools tackling misaligned incentives, because they are perceived by stock market
investors to be effective in targeting industry-wide risk dynamics. The finding that credit
growth tools are associated with a perceived increase in systemic linkage risk may be
attributable to risk-shifting behavior by the banks. Faced with policy measures restricting
credit expansion for specific types of loans or to certain types of counterparties, banks
may avoid the regulation by reallocating credit or increase their exposure to other asset
classes that are not subject to the regulation (as also found by Cizel et al., 2016, Aiyar
et al., 2014 and Cerutti et al., 2017 among others). Acharya et al. (2018) document that
banks that are more exposed to macroprudential policy actions shift mortgage lending to
corporate loans relative to the pre-policy period and that the increase is mostly targeted
towards riskier borrowers. Moreover, more exposed banks increase their holdings of risky
securities compared with less affected banks.
Finally, the most granular approach we implement is to investigate the refinement of
the 4 types of tools into their constituent policy action announcements. This is reported
in columns (9) to (12) of table 6. Within the credit growth tools the lending standards
are found to be most effective in decreasing the individual risk of the banks (-4.2%) as
well as their dynamic beta (-3.4%). This result is in line with Claessens et al. (2013) who
find that policy aimed at borrowers, e.g. loan-to-value ratios and debt-to-income ratios,
are effective in (indirectly) reducing banking system vulnerabilities. The explanation for
this finding is that real estate markets are an important driver of financial cycles and as
a result they may hurt banks when the cycle turns. Next to this, borrower-oriented tools
face less implementation challenges.
Within the group of market liquidity measures, the announcement of liquidity tools
has a pronounced downward impact on bank risk. Not only do we find an association
with systemic risk measures (-5.1% for the MES and -6.1% for the dynamic beta), but
also bank individual risk (-2.3%) as well as the systemic linkage component (-3.4%) are
judged by the stock market to decrease as a result of the new liquidity measures. This
effect is consistent with the finding by López-Espinosa et al. (2013) who document that
the amount of short-term wholesale funding is a key determinant for systemic risk as
measured by the COV AR, which is closely related to our systemic linkage component.
This finding is also consistent with Banerjee and Mio (2018) who find that banks react to
liquidity regulation by increasing the share of high-quality liquid assets and non-financial
deposits while reducing the intra-financial loans and short-term wholesale funding. Also
van Oordt and Zhou (2019) find that a larger amount of stable deposit funding is as-
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sociated with a lower level of systemic linkage. Tools aimed at improving the funding
risk of the banks are thus found to be an effective tool to increase financial stability.
Finally, within the set of tools aimed at strengthening bank resilience and remedying mis-
aligned incentives, the most pronounced impact is found for the other tools, which mainly
comprise crisis management tools and debt resolution policies. On average, these tools
decrease bank beta by more than 10% and the effect is also clearly present for the sys-
temic linkage component. This implies that market participants assess crisis management
tools such as new resolution tools or the implementation of a bail-in regime as credible.
This is in line with papers such as Schäfer et al. (2016) who document that bank CDS
spreads and stock prices have reacted to bail-in events in Europe or Ignatowski et al.
(2014) who report that banks most affected by changes in the US bank resolution regime
significantly decrease their overall risk taking. With respect to capital regulation, we do
not find significant effects on bank systemic risk. This does not imply that capital regu-
lation is not related to financial stability (see e.g. De Jonghe (2010), Baker and Wurgler
(2015) and Martinez-Miera and Suarez (2012) among others). In this study, however, we
are interested in the perceived market reaction to a change in capital regulation at the
time of the announcement. There can be different reasons why we don’t find a significant
announcement effect of capital regulation on bank systemic risk. First, the announcement
of capital buffers comes on top of already enforced capital regulation (Basel 3). As most
banks hold capital buffers in excess of the regulatory minimum, the announcement of ad-
ditional capital buffers may not impose additional constraints. Second, the announcement
of SIFI buffers does not always contain new information for market participants (Abreu
and Gulamhussen, 2013). Third, with respect to the announcement of countercyclical
buffers the effect may be limited because most of these announcements are anticipated by
financial market participants. In particular, national central banks frequently use forward
guidance in their communication concerning countercyclical buffers.
5.2. Heterogeneous impact across banks
We hypothesize that different types of macroprudential measures will affect different
types of banks in a heterogeneous way. When, e.g., the macroprudential authority un-
dertakes actions to limit certain exposures, only banks with such exposures will need
to take remedial action. As a consequence, stock market investors are expected to per-
ceive the risk-reducing effectiveness of macroprudential announcements as heterogeneous
across banks. In table 8 we examine this hypothesis by interacting the macroprudential
index with relevant bank business model characteristics capturing their asset and liability
composition, the revenue structure, their exposure to bad loans and capital adequacy.
To simplify the interpretation of the results we perform a factor analysis on the bank
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characteristics in table 7 in line with Mergaerts and Vander Vennet (2016).4 This ap-
proach allows us to cluster bank characteristics into economically meaningful business
model types. If there is common variance, this will be reflected by factors associated with
eigenvalues above 0. The higher the eigenvalue, the more the factor is able to explain
common variance. We opt to retain the first 3 factors which explain 98% of all variation
in the bank characteristics. The first factor, which explains almost half of the variation, is
associated with a retail-based strategy. It positively relates to the loan, deposit and cap-
ital ratios, but is negatively related to size and income diversification. The second factor
loads negatively on the loan ratio but very positively on income diversification and hence
captures banks that more actively engage in non-intermediation activities. The third fac-
tor is mainly correlated with the asset quality of the bank since it is positively correlated
with the non-performing loans ratio. Based on these correlations, we label the first factor
RETAIL, the second factor DIVERSIFICATION and the third factor DISTRESS.5 In
contrast to the individual bank characteristics, the 3 factors are not correlated with each
other which makes the interpretation of the results more economically intuitive.
In a next step we interact the 3 business model factors with the macroprudential index
and its subcomponents. In columns (1) – (3) of table 8 we report the results based on
the aggregate macroprudential index in which the policy tools are equally weighted. In
the next columns, we replace the aggregate index by its constituent subindices capturing
tools directed at credit growth, liquidity, exposure limits and bank resilience (as explained
in the construction of table 6). For each set of estimations we report the association with
IR, SL and beta. To save space, we do not report the results using the MES which are
similar to the results when using the dynamic beta as dependent variable.
4We exclude bank ROA from the factor analysis since this variable is a result variable rather than a
business model characteristic.
5We acknowledge that the labeling of factors is always somewhat subjective. The choice for the first
two labels follows Mergaerts and Vander Vennet (2016). In our case, the "Retail" factor mainly loads
on deposits (and size) so we link variation in this factor mainly to the structure of the liability and
funding side, while the second "Diversification" factor relates more to the composition of the asset side
and consequently also the income structure of the bank. This finding is in line with Köhler (2014) and
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) who find that a business model can be specified with two variables:
non-deposit funding and income diversification.
26
Jo
urn
al 
Pre
-pr
of
Factor Eigenvalue Proportion Cumulative
Factor 1 2.07 0.59 0.59
Factor 2 1.02 0.29 0.89
Factor 3 0.31 0.09 0.98
Factor 4 0.07 0.02 1.00
Factor 5 0.01 0.00 1.00
Factor 6 0.00 0.00 1.00
Correlation with characteristics
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Communality
RETAIL DIVERSIFICATION DISTRESS
SIZE -0.87 -0.12 0.17 80%
LTA 0.31 -0.67 -0.20 59%
DEP 0.73 -0.01 0.03 58%
NPL 0.39 0.10 0.44 35%
DIV -0.18 0.69 -0.22 56%
ETA 0.71 0.27 -0.03 61%
Table 7: This table displays the results of the factor analysis on a number of bank business model characteristics conducted
using the iterated principal factor method. The upper panel displays the eigenvalues of the common factors. The lower
panel reports correlations of the predicted factors with the observed bank variables and the communality associated with
each variable. A higher communality indicates that the variable is better explained by the common factors.
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Aggregate index Credit growth Liquidity Exposure limits Resilience
IR SL Beta IR SL Beta IR SL Beta IR SL Beta IR SL Beta
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Lagged dependent 0.746*** 0.711*** 0.742*** 0.745*** 0.712*** 0.743*** 0.744*** 0.706*** 0.739*** 0.741*** 0.712*** 0.743*** 0.745*** 0.710*** 0.742***
(0.011) (0.019) (0.017) (0.011) (0.018) (0.017) (0.011) (0.018) (0.017) (0.011) (0.019) (0.017) (0.011) (0.018) (0.017)
MacroPru -0.007*** -0.0001 -0.007*** -0.010*** 0.005*** -0.005* -0.003 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.006** 0.001 -0.004** -0.005** -0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
RETAIL -0.044*** 0.015 -0.028 -0.048*** 0.018 -0.029 -0.050*** 0.037*** -0.014 -0.033** 0.001 -0.028 -0.059*** 0.030** -0.029
(0.014) (0.014) (0.021) (0.012) (0.013) (0.020) (0.013) (0.013) (0.020) (0.016) (0.016) (0.025) (0.012) (0.013) (0.019)
DIVERSIFICATION 0.005 0.013 0.019 0.009 0.005 0.015 0.011* -0.000 0.011 -0.028*** 0.007 -0.020 0.007 0.007 0.014
(0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.014) (0.018) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
DISTRESS 0.051*** 0.030** 0.078*** 0.048*** -0.020** 0.032*** 0.049*** 0.011 0.062*** 0.024** -0.007 0.020 0.049*** 0.002 0.052***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.021) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.016) (0.012) (0.014) (0.018) (0.009) (0.010) (0.015)
MacroPru x RETAIL -0.001 0.001*** 0.001 -0.002 0.003** 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.00004 -0.004** 0.004* -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.0003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
MacroPru x DIVERSIFICATION -0.00003 -0.0004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004* -0.004 0.010*** 0.004 0.007*** -0.001 0.005* -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
MacroPru x DISTRESS -0.001 -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.001 -0.003* -0.003 -0.002 -0.018*** -0.017*** 0.004* -0.004* 0.001 -0.001 -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
R2 (within) 0.780 0.629 0.681 0.780 0.629 0.681 0.780 0.629 0.681 0.781 0.629 0.681 0.780 0.629 0.681
Obs 15686
Banks 113
Sample period 2000-2017
Time fixed effects Yes
Bank variables Yes
Macro variables Yes
T-value RETAIL -0.75 2.65 0.90 -1.18 2.46 0.48 -0.37 0.65 -0.01 -2.06 1.85 -0.20 1.03 -0.96 0.18
T-value DIVERSIFICATION -0.04 -0.51 -0.52 -1.50 -0.83 -1.93 -1.37 3.60 0.97 3.62 -0.49 1.75 -0.22 -0.32 -0.41
T-value DISTRESS -0.73 -4.41 -3.42 -0.69 -1.74 -1.51 -0.70 -6.09 -3.94 1.89 -1.85 0.16 -0.92 -3.93 -3.18
Table 8: This table reports the effect of macroprudential policy on bank systemic risk based on equation 2 in which we interact the macroprudential index with the 3 bank business model
factors (RETAIL, DIVERSIFICATION and DISTRESS) obtained by the factor analysis executed in table 7. The net effects of a tightening in macroprudential policy on bank risk are
graphically shown in figure 2. The model is estimated using bank fixed effects. Time fixed effects are also included in the model. Standard errors are the Driscoll Kraay standard errors which
are robust to general forms of cross-sectional and temporal dependence when the time dimension becomes large. Control variables are omitted from the regression table to save space. *, **,
*** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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In an estimation setup with multiple interactions, the coefficient on the macropruden-
tial index is not informative since the full effect is the sum of the standalone effect and
the partial derivative of bank risk with respect to all interaction terms. The full marginal
effect per bank based on equation 2 is calculated as follows:
∂Riski,c,t
∂MacroPruc,t
= θˆ +
3∑
k=1
ψˆkBankFactork,i,t (12)
Bankj,i,t is the vector of factors that explain the bank business model. From equation
12 it can be seen that we obtain a unique marginal effect per bank per year (marginal
effects do not vary within each year). In figure 2 we show the histograms of the total
impacts of a change in the macroprudential policy stance on the individual bank risk,
the systemic linkage and the dynamic beta, based on the estimation results in table 8.
The histograms capture the magnitude of the effect of policy measures on risk across
the European banks and display the dispersion of the impacts. In addition, we color the
bars for which more than 50% of the impacts within each bar are significant at the 1%
level in dark to highlight the cases where policy actions are judged by equity investors
to produce the most pronounced impact. In addition, to further illustrate the results in
table 8, we display the location of the bank business model factors in the histograms. We
do this by indicating bars that contain banks with, on average, a high value of one of the
factors with a + and bars that contain banks with, on average, a low value with a -. For
example, if banks within a certain bar have, on average, a RETAIL-factor value that is
higher than the 75th percentile of the RETAIL factor, this bar is indicated with a + sign.
If banks within a certain bar have, on average, a RETAIL-factor value that is lower than
the 25th percentile of the RETAIL factor, this bar is indicated with a - sign. The same
method is used for all 3 factors. Last, we also indicate the strength of the transmission of
macroprudential policy through the bank business model factors by showing the t-values
for the 3 interaction terms in the bottom rows of table 8. The higher the absolute value
of the t-statistic, the more important the business model factor is in the transmission of
macroprudential policy to the systemic risk measures. This visually corresponds to more
+ signs or - signs in figure 2 that are clustered around significant bars situated at one
side of the histogram.
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Figure 2: Histograms for the total impact of a unit increase (tightening) in the macroprudential stance on individual risk, systemic linkage and beta (in percentages)
over a one-month horizon. The dark parts of the histogram bars represent bars for which more than 75% of the total impacts are significant at the 1% level.
RETAIL reflects the retail orientation of the bank and is related to the funding structure and size of the bank. DIVERSIFICATION reflects the income
diversification of the bank and positively relates to the income diversification and negatively to the proportion of loans. DISTRESS captures the asset quality of
the bank. This factor loads positively on the non-performing loans to total loans ratio. Bars that contain banks which exhibit, on average, a high value (>75th
percentile) for one of the factors are indicated with a ’+’ and bars that contain banks with, on average, a low value of one of the factors (<25th percentile) are
indicated with a ’-’.
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For the aggregate macroprudential index (first row in figure 2) we find that the total
impact of policy measures exhibits a downward effect on the systemic risk of the banks
(beta/MES) and that this is primarily driven by lower individual risk. Moreover, the
top left panel shows that the downward impact on IR is very concentrated, i.e. negative
with a very small dispersion. Technically, the interpretation is that policy actions are
associated with a significantly lower variation of the banks’ stock returns relative to the
standard deviation in total stock market returns, which indicates that investors recognize
that the macroprudential policy actions make the banks more stable. This is evidence
that macroprudential measures are interpreted by the stock market as very effective tools
to contain the idiosyncratic risk of European banks. For the systemic linkage component
of bank risk, the evidence is mixed, some banks exhibit a significant downward shift of
SL, others are perceived to become more correlated with the market. Hence, the ultimate
effect of macroprudential measures on SL across bank business models differs across banks.
Next, we investigate which bank business models are impacted most by macropru-
dential policy tools. For this we need to focus on the interaction terms between the
macroprudential index and the bank business model factors in table 8 as well as on the
distribution of the bank business model factors (location of the + and – signs) in figure
2. To illustrate the interpretation process, we first consider the results for the aggregate
index. Visual inspection of the first row of panels in figure 2 indicates that a macropru-
dential tightening is associated with a decrease of the individual risk component (all banks
are situated firmly left of zero), an insignificant effect on the systemic linkage component
(banks are evenly distributed left and right of zero), resulting in a downward effect on
the systemic risk of the banks (beta/MES). These graphical findings are confirmed by the
coefficients in columns (1) – (3) in table 8, significantly negative for IR, insignificant for
SL, yielding a significant negative effect on systemic risk (beta in column 3). Next, we
focus on the interaction effects with the RETAIL factor. Although the top left panel in
figure 2 shows that the most retail-oriented banks (those with a + sign) are situated to
the left of the impact distribution of the individual risk component, the dispersion across
banks is insufficient to make this effect significant, hence the interaction term of RETAIL
with the macroprudential index remains insignificant in column (1) of table 8. The co-
efficient on the interaction term for the systemic linkage component, however, is positive
and significant and this is reflected in the finding that retail banks are situated right of
zero for the SL component in the middle top panel in figure 2, indicating an increase of
their systemic linkage risk. The resulting net effect on beta/MES is insignificant for the
RETAIL factor because these banks are situated on both ends of the impact distribution.
When we apply this procedure for interpreting the combined findings in table 8 and
figure 2 and when we only consider the significant interaction terms, the following pic-
ture emerges. First, for the RETAIL banks, i.e. those primarily engaged in traditional
intermediation activities, the left panels of figure 2 indicate that the strongest downward
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effect of macroprudential measures on the IR component stem from credit growth mea-
sures and exposure limits (the RETAIL + signs are situated on the left side of the impact
distribution, although in table 8 only the interaction term with exposure limits is signifi-
cant). These findings confirm that measures aimed at curbing specific lending exposures
are interpreted by the stock market as effective tools to decrease the idiosyncratic risk of
retail banks. However, when we consider the SL component (middle panels of figure 2),
the banks with the highest loadings (+ signs) on the RETAIL factor are associated with
an increase in their perceived systemic linkage risk precisely for the credit growth and ex-
posure limit tools. Both interactions terms also carry a positive and significant coefficient
in table 8. These results are compatible with a risk-shifting explanation. Since lending-
oriented tools force banks to lower their exposures to certain types of counterparties or
to disinvest certain types of loans or securities, the banks may shift the asset composition
towards exposures that make them more interconnected to the financial system. As a
typical example, restrictions on mortgage lending, e.g. in the form of loan-to-value caps
or higher capital weights, may induce a shift to corporate lending or securities, which
exposes these banks to business cycle shocks. This finding is in line with Acharya et al.
(2018) who find that banks increase their holdings of risky securities and corporate credit
in response to the introduction of loan-to-value or loan-to-income limits in Ireland. Cizel
et al. (2016) also show that mainly quantity restrictions, such as exposure limits, are more
prone to strong substitution effects. In addition, banks may become more similar. Be-
cause of macroprudential restrictions, banks may be forced to increase their exposures to
common counterparties or assets of similar risk. This may in turn increase the probability
of contagion because regulation then leads to common exposures, not diversification. The
increase in the SL component indicates that stock market investors are aware that retail
banks may become more vulnerable to business cycle shocks. In terms of policy this calls
for a careful calibration of macroprudential measures in order to avoid the unintended
consequences of risk-shifting behavior by the affected banks.
Second, for the banks with a high loading on the DIVERSIFICATION factor, the
combined findings in table 8 and figure 2 can be summarized as follows. The interaction
term with macroprudential policy indicates a downward effect on beta/MES for the credit
growth tools which is more pronounced for more diversified banks. As can be seen from
the left panel of figure 2 this risk-reducing effect for more diversified banks is clearly
driven by the individual risk component. This finding is expected since these banks are
less dependent on lending and hence are less affected by credit growth restrictions. Yet,
for the exposure limit actions, the effect on systemic risk for diversified banks is positive
and marginally significant and is driven entirely by a higher perceived individual risk.
A possible explanation is that this type of measures is seen to force diversified banks
to become over-reliant on non-interest income. Previous studies have shown that non-
interest activities are more volatile and not associated with better performance (Stiroh
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and Rumble, 2006) and lead to higher income volatility (Stiroh, 2004). For European
banks, Baele et al. (2007) find that the systematic risk of banks is positively associated
with various indicators of bank diversification, including the non-interest income share
(see also Lepetit et al. (2008)), while Köhler (2014) reports that an increasing share of
non-interest income makes investment-oriented banks more risky. The most pronounced
effect for the DIVERSIFICATION factor is the positive association between the liquidity
measures and the systemic linkage risk component of these banks. The interaction term
in table 8 is very significant and in the middle panel of figure 2 the + signs for these
banks are firmly situated at the right hand side of the net impact distribution. Imposing
additional liquidity constraints forces these banks to increase their exposure to financial
market movements (more securities holdings on the asset side to comply with the liquidity
coverage ratio and/or more market-based long-term funding at the liability side to comply
with the net stable funding ratio) which stock markets interpret as increasing the systemic
linkage risk of the banks.
Finally, we examine the DISTRESSED banks, i.e. those banks with a high loading on
NPL. When macroprudential authorities announce actions, their objective is to lower the
risk profile of the banks. An important issue is how stock markets perceive the effectiveness
of these policy actions for the weakest banks. The results are broadly encouraging. In table
8, the interaction term of beta with the aggregate macroprudential index is significantly
negative and this is predominantly caused by the negative coefficients for both the liquidity
measures and the resilience tools. Moreover, this downward effect on the banks’ risk is
entirely driven by a lowering of the SL component. Notice that these negative coefficients
exhibit the highest t-values (bottom panel of table 8). Likewise, in figure 2 the + signs
for the DISTRESSED factor are situated on the left side of the impact distribution for
beta/MES and SL for the aggregate index as well as for the indices based on liquidity
and resilience actions. The interpretation is clear. Additional liquidity and resilience
requirements are judged as effective in making the weakest banks more resistant to shocks
and this is interpreted by stock market investors as decreasing these banks’ vulnerability
to systemic contagion.
The findings in table 8 and figure 2 confirm all previous results. Macroprudential
actions are associated with a downward impact on the systemic risk of the banks, measured
as beta/MES, and this holds for the aggregate index as well as the indices for credit growth
and resilience measures. This conclusion follows from the significantly negative coefficient
on the macroprudential index in table 8 and from the dark bars (with the most significant
results) which are situated on the left side of the net impact distribution in figure 2.
Moreover, the effect on the systemic risk of the banks is perceived a mainly driven by
a downward shift of the individual risk component. In figure 2 the distribution for the
impact of the aggregate index on IR is entirely situated in negative territory and it is
moreover very narrow indicating a common effect across all banks. The effect on the
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systemic linkage component, on the other hand, is mixed, with some dark bars situated
left of zero, while some indicate an increase of the SL component, which we argue is
caused by risk-shifting behavior.
5.3. Robustness checks
A standard concern is that the results are driven by our choices for measurement of
the main variables, namely the macroprudential index and the bank risk variables. There-
fore we check whether alternative measures corroborate our findings. We also perform a
subsample analysis in which we subdivide our sample according to geographical areas and
time periods (pre/post crisis) and we investigate whether there are asymmetric effects
when comparing policy tightenings with policy loosenings.
As a first robustness check we use alternative measures to capture the individual risk
of a bank. As a first alternative measure we use the 5-year CDS spread of the banks which
are taken from Markit. The CDS spread reflects the credit risk of a bank. As a second
measure we use the probability of default (PD) of the banks. The PD is estimated using
macro-financial and firm-specific information and is taken from the CRI/MRI database
which is publicly available.6 To align the results with the 5-year CDS spread we use the
60-month PD value. Third, value-at-risk is used as a measure for bank individual risk.
As an alternative measure for the systemic linkage of the bank we calculate the CoVaR
of the bank as in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016). The CoVaR reflects the risk of the
financial system when a financial institution is in distress relative to the median state.
The results are displayed in table 9. From this table we can conclude that the results are
robust to alternative measures for individual risk and systemic linkage.
6Data can be downloaded from https://www.rmicri.org/en/
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Individual risk Systemic linkage Individual risk Systemic linkage Individual risk Systemic linkage
IR CDS PD VaR SL CoVaR IR CDS PD VaR SL CoVaR IR CDS PD VaR SL CoVaR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Lagged dependent 0.745*** 0.882*** 0.910*** 0.753*** 0.712*** 0.702*** 0.743*** 0.876*** 0.909*** 0.752*** 0.709*** 0.698*** 0.741*** 0.874*** 0.905*** 0.749*** 0.706*** 0.696***
(0.011) (0.016) (0.008) (0.011) (0.018) (0.019) (0.011) (0.016) (0.008) (0.011) (0.018) (0.019) (0.011) (0.016) (0.008) (0.011) (0.017) (0.018)
MacroPru -0.023*** -0.008 -0.022* -0.024*** 0.003 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Credit growth -0.038*** -0.056*** -0.043 -0.040*** 0.017*** 0.016***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Lending standards -0.042*** -0.047** -0.042 -0.043*** 0.007 0.009
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Sectoral risk weights -0.019 -0.071* -0.094** -0.019 0.0170 0.0164
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Credit limits 0.015 0.0873 0.2105 0.016 0.007 0.007
(0.011) (0.023) (0.015) (0.011) (0.017) (0.018)
Market liquidity -0.011 0.040 -0.021 -0.012 -0.024* -0.023**
(0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Liquidity tools -0.023* 0.016 -0.010 -0.023* -0.034*** -0.032***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Concentration -0.023* -0.064** 0.011 -0.024* 0.034*** 0.036***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Exposure limits -0.030** -0.095** -0.031 -0.031** 0.044*** 0.046***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Resilience tools -0.011 0.008 -0.010 -0.012 -0.013* -0.016*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Minimum capital 0.012 0.071 -0.005 0.016 0.031* 0.029
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Capital buffers -0.0003 0.011 -0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.003
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Tax -0.046** -0.079 -0.126** -0.047** -0.013 -0.013
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Provisioning rules 0.081*** 0.484*** 0.010 0.088*** -0.013 -0.013
(0.008) (0.022) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012)
Other -0.011 -0.007 0.07 -0.023 -0.081** -0.078**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012)
R2 (within) 0.78 0.99 0.887 0.804 0.629 0.865 0.780 0.990 0.887 0.804 0.630 0.866 0.781 0.990 0.887 0.804 0.631 0.866
Obs 15686 5912 13387 15686 15686 15686 15686 5912 13387 15686 15686 15686 15686 5912 13387 15686 15686 15686
Banks 113 45 97 113 113 113 113 45 97 113 113 113 113 45 97 113 113 113
Time fixed effects Yes
Bank variables Yes
Macro variables Yes
Table 9: Robustness check whereby the baseline model is estimated using alternative measures that capture individual risk, namely the CDS spread, the PD and the VaR. As alternative
measures for the systemic linkage we use the CoVaR. The model is estimated using bank fixed effects. Time fixed effects are also included in the model. The coefficients on the macroprudential
index and the subcategories represent the long-run coefficients as measured in equation 1 by θ
1−λ . Standard errors are the Driscoll Kraay standard errors which are robust to general forms
of cross-sectional and temporal dependence when the time dimension becomes large. Control variables are omitted from the regression table to save space. *, **, *** represent significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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As a second robustness check we construct the macroprudential index in an alternative
way. More specifically, we recode the index based on a ’policy-on’ or ’policy-off’ procedure.
When a specific tools is activated, the index goes up by 1. When the tool is deactivated
the index drops to zero. The results are displayed in table 10. The results are again
comparable to the results obtained in table 6 indicating that the activation of a tool is
the most important event in the life cycle of a policy tool.
IR SL Beta MES IR SL Beta MES IR SL Beta MES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Lagged dependent 0.745*** 0.712*** 0.743*** 0.6877*** 0.742*** 0.707*** 0.741*** 0.687*** 0.743*** 0.705*** 0.739*** 0.685***
(0.011) (0.018) (0.017) (0.0161) (0.011) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.011) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
MacroPru -0.019*** -0.001 -0.023*** -0.022***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Credit growth -0.046*** 0.017*** -0.027*** -0.012
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Lending standards -0.035*** 0.001 -0.034*** -0.031**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Sectoral risk weights -0.031* 0.017 -0.015 0.016
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
Credit limits -0.011 0.031 0.023 0.1269
(0.016) (0.021) (0.017) (0.036)
Market liquidity -0.003 -0.030** -0.038* -0.041*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
Liquidity tools -0.027* -0.037*** -0.065*** -0.066***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
Concentration -0.019 0.034*** 0.012 0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
Exposure limits -0.011 0.034*** 0.023 -0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
Resilience tools -0.015* -0.023** -0.042*** -0.038***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Minimum capital 0.004 0.031* 0.034 0.0222
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009)
Capital buffers -0.003 -0.006 -0.007 -0.0285
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009)
Tax -0.042 -0.010 -0.042 -0.022
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012)
Provisioning rules 0.089** -0.084** -0.003 -0.053
(0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.027)
Other tools -0.011 -0.098*** -0.126*** -0.069**
(0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010)
R2 (within) 0.780 0.629 0.681 0.637 0.781 0.630 0.681 0.637 0.780 0.631 0.682 0.637
Obs 15686
banks 113
Sample period 2000-2017
Time fixed effects Yes
Bank variables Yes
Macro variables Yes
Table 10: Robustness check in which the macroprudential index is alternatively constructed using dummies that can only
take the values of 0, 1 indicating whether a tool is in place or not. The model is estimated using bank fixed effects. Time
fixed effects are also included in the model. The coefficients on the macroprudential index and the subcategories represent
the long-run coefficients as measured in equation 1 by θ
1−λ . Standard errors are the Driscoll Kraay standard errors which
are robust to general forms of cross-sectional and temporal dependence when the time dimension becomes large. Control
variables are omitted from the regression table to save space. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
As a third robustness check we analyze whether or not the impact of macroprudential
policy differs across geographical regions, across periods or whether there are asymmetric
effects when comparing policy tightenings with policy loosenings. To investigate the differ-
ences across regions we create regional dummies which we interact with the macropruden-
tial index. We distinguish 4 regions: core Eurozone countries (Austria, Belgium France,
The Netherlands, Germany) and the UK, the peripheral Eurozone countries (Spain, Italy,
Greece, Portugal, Malta, Cyprus and Ireland), the Scandinavian countries (Denmark,
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Sweden and Finland) and the Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) (Roma-
nia, Hungary, Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Poland). The results can be found in table
11 (first four columns). We include the macroprudential index and the interaction terms
between the index and the periphery dummy, the Scandinavian dummy and the CEEC
dummy. The coefficients on the index itself capture the impact of a macroprudential tight-
ening in the core countries on the systemic risk measures and serves as a benchmark to
compare the impact of macroprudential policy in the other regions. In the core countries,
macroprudential policy has a downward effect on banks’ individual risk, as perceived by
the market. Macroprudential policy appears to have no immediate impact on the sys-
temic linkage of banks situated in core Europe. In the peripheral countries the impact of
macroprudential tools on the individual risk is limited: the coefficient on the benchmark
and on the interaction term cancel each other out. On the other hand, in the peripheral
countries the impact on the systemic linkage component is more pronounced: a tighten-
ing in macroprudential policy leads to a reduction in the systemic linkage component of
1.7%. In the Scandinavian countries banks do not seem to benefit from macroprudential
policy as the systemic linkage even increases following a tightening in the macropruden-
tial policy stance. Last, the CEEC countries benefit most in terms of individual risk as
this component drops by 3% in response to macroprudential policy. This translates into a
downward effect on the beta/MES of around -3% as the systemic linkage does not respond
to changes in macroprudential policy.
Next, we investigate whether the impact of macroprudential policy differs across dif-
ferent time periods in the next 4 columns of table 11. We therefore divide the sample
into 3 different periods: the pre-crisis period running from 2000 to end 2007, the crisis
period from 2008 to 2010 and the post-crisis period going from 2011 to the end of 2017.
We use the pre-crisis period as the benchmark period in these regressions. Before 2008,
macroprudential tightenings are associated with a decrease in the individual risk but an
increase in the systemic linkage component, resulting in a limited net effect. During the
crisis period, the effects on the systemic risk measures are not significantly different from
the effects during the pre-risis periods. It appears that during the post-crisis period, from
2011 onward, macroprudential policy benefits all components of systemic risk indicat-
ing that macroprudential policy is getting more effective and that the tools which are
announced in this period have the desired impact.
Last, we analyse the presence of asymmetric effects with respect to tightening and loos-
ening policy measures. We therefore create two new indices that reflect only tools that
are tightening in nature (MacroPru tightening), and an index that captures measures
that had the objective to loosen the macroprudential policy stance (MacroPru loosening).
For the latter index we denote loosenings by positive weightings instead of negative ones
to make the results more comprehensible. The MacroPru loosening index contains for
example relaxations in the level of a certain tool, which receives a weight of 0.25, but it
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IR SL Beta MES IR SL Beta MES IR SL Beta MES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Lagged dependent 0.740*** 0.709*** 0.743*** 0.688*** 0.744*** 0.712*** 0.743*** 0.688*** 0.744*** 0.711*** 0.742*** 0.688***
(0.011) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.011) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.011) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016)
MacroPru -0.019*** -0.00003 -0.019*** -0.012*
Core countries (0.001) (0.001) -0.002 (0.002)
MacroPru 0.023*** -0.017** 0.004 -0.009
× Periphery coun-
tries
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
MacroPru -0.007 0.010** 0.004 -0.003
× Scandinavian
countries
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
MacroPru -0.011* -0.003 -0.019 -0.019**
× CEEC countries (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
MacroPru -0.016 0.014 -0.004 0.013
Period 2000-2007 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
MacroPru × Crisis 0.004 0.003 0.008 -0.006
Period 2008-2010 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
MacroPru× Postcri-
sis
-0.003 -0.010 -0.015 -0.028**
period 2010-2017 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
MacroPru tighten-
ing
-0.023*** -0.003 -0.027*** -0.022***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
MacroPru Loosening 0.012** -0.010 0.001 0.013
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
R2 (within) 0.781 0.630 0.681 0.637 0.780 0.630 0.681 0.637 0.780 0.629 0.681 0.637
Obs 15686
banks 113
Sample period 2000-2017
Time fixed effects Yes
Bank variables Yes
Macro variables Yes
Table 11: Robustness check in which the baseline model is estimated using different dummies/indices reflecting different
geographical regions, time periods and different types of policy tools (loosening or tightening). Time fixed effects are
also included in the model. The coefficients on the macroprudential index and the subcategories represent the long-run
coefficients as measured in equation 1 by θ
1−λ . Standard errors are the Driscoll Kraay standard errors which are robust to
general forms of cross-sectional and temporal dependence when the time dimension becomes large. Control variables are
omitted from the regression table to save space. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
also includes deactivations, which are given a weight of +1 in this exercise. The results
are summarised in the last 4 columns of table 11. As found in the previous regressions,
macroprudential tightenings are associated with a decrease in the individual risk com-
ponent of banks while the impact on the systemic linkage component is limited. Policy
loosenings, however, are followed by an increase in the individual risk component. The
systemic linkage component is not significantly impacted by policy loosenings.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the impact of macroprudential policy announcements on
bank systemic risk measures in Europe between 2000 and 2017 and we disentangle the
transmission channels through which different macroprudential policy tools may affect
financial stability. We construct a macroprudential index to capture the macroprudential
policy stance in a country and we subdivide the aggregate index into subindices according
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to the objectives of different types of tools and their design. We use the macroprudential
index and its subindices to explore how bank systemic risk is affected by macroprudential
policy. We use a dynamic panel framework to assess the impact of macroprudential tools
on bank systemic risk both in the short run and the long run using stock market indicators
of bank risk. We decompose the systemic risk measure in an individual bank risk compo-
nent and a systemic linkage component. Finally, we analyse whether the transmission of
macroprudential policy differs across different bank business models.
We find that, on average, the announcement of macroprudential policy actions have
a downward effect on bank systemic risk. Whereas previous studies have documented a
moderating effect of macroprudential measures on bank lending and real estate prices, we
confirm that macroprudential policy is also effective in containing bank systemic risk, as
assessed by stock market investors. This is an important finding because lowering sys-
temic bank risk remains the ultimate objective of macroprudential policies. The strongest
effect on bank risk is found for the targeted, legally binding tools that are associated with
sanctions in case of non-compliance. A second conclusion is that different types of macro-
prudential tools in general achieve their designated objectives. We find that borrower-
oriented tools and exposure limits primarily have a beneficial impact on the individual
risk component of banks. Liquidity tools and measures to increase the resilience of banks
are also found to lower the systemic linkage component of bank risk, hence these tools ap-
pear to be effective in targeting industry-wide risk dynamics. However, our results reveal
the presence of risk-shifting behavior by banks confronted with binding macroprudential
measures. While macroprudential announcements are associated with a downward effect
of systemic risk, the risk reduction is primarily due to a decrease of the individual bank
risk component, not the systemic linkage component. Worse, credit growth measures
and exposure limits are associated with an increase of the systemic linkage component
for some banks. In trying to comply with the rules, these banks may engage in riskier
activities or shift to holding similar exposures, which increases the interconnectedness of
the banking system.
We also investigate heterogeneous effects of macroprudential measures across different
types of banks. We therefore interact the macroprudential index with business model
factors that reflect the retail orientation, the income diversification and the loan quality
of the bank. We find that credit growth tools and exposure limits are found to exhibit the
most pronounced downward effect for retail-oriented banks. However, for retail banks we
also observe an increase in their perceived systemic linkage risk, which we attribute to risk-
shifting behavior. Since lending-oriented tools force these banks to lower their exposures
to certain types of counterparties or to disinvest certain types of loans or securities,
these banks may shift their asset composition towards exposures that make them more
vulnerable to business cycle or financial market shocks. In terms of policy, our results call
for a careful calibration of lending-oriented macroprudential restrictions in order to avoid
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the negative consequences of risk-shifting behavior. For diversified banks, credit growth
restrictions are associated with higher individual risk, because they may be forced to
rely even more on potentially volatile sources of non-interest income. Similarly, liquidity
tools increase the systemic linkage risk of diversified banks because these restrictions force
them to become even more exposed to financial market shocks. Macroprudential policies
appear to be most effective for distressed banks, i.e. banks with a high ratio of non-
performing loans. The systemic linkage component decreases significantly more for these
banks compared to their healthy counterparts, and this effect is found for all tools.
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Appendix 1: Estimating the Marginal Expected Shortfall
To estimate the MES, we first model the bivariate process of bank and market returns:
rt = H
1
2
t εt
where rt = (rm,t ri,t)
′ is the vector of market and individual bank returns at time t,
εt = (εm,t ξi,t)
′ is the vector of i.i.d. (02×1, I2×2) shocks. Ht is the time-varying conditional
covariance matrix of which H
1
2
t is the lower Cholesky factor.
Ht =
[
σ2m,t σi,tσm,tρi,t
σi,tσm,tρi,t σ
2
i,t
]
⇔ H
1
2
t =
[
σm,t 0
σi,tρi,t σi,t
√
1− ρ2i,t
]
The returns for the individual stock are therefore described by:
ri,t = σi,tρi,tεm,t + σi,t
√
1− ρ2i,tξi,t
The MES can be written more explicitly as a function of correlation, volatility and
tail expectations:
MESi,t−1 = Et−1(ri,t|rm,t < C)
= σi,tρi,tEt−1
(
εm,t|εm,t < C
σm,t
)
+ σi,t
√
1− ρ2i,tEt−1
(
ξi,t|εm,t < C
σm,t
)
The MES measures a bank’s expected equity loss when the market falls below a certain
threshold over a given horizon. In line with Acharya et al. (2012), the threshold C that
defines a crisis is set at a -2% loss in the relevant market index over a one-day period.
To estimate the time-varying correlations, stochastic volatilities and tail expectations
we follow Brownlees and Engle (2017) and Idier et al. (2014) and describe the estimation
procedure below. In essence, we need 3 components to estimate the MES: (i) the volatility,
(ii) the correlation and (iii) the tail expectations.
(i) Estimation of univariate conditional variances
Estimation of σi,t and σm,t can be based on any volatility model. Idier et al. (2014)
use an asymmetric GARCH specification:
σ2m,t = ωm + αmr
2
m,t−1 + γmr
2
m,t−1Im,t−1 + βmσ
2
m,t−1
σ2i,t = ωi + αir
2
i,t−1 + γir
2
i,t−1I(i,t−1) + βiσ
2
i,t−1
where Im,t = 1rm,t<0 and Ii,t = 1ri,t<0 . It is thus assumed that volatility tends to
increase more with negative shocks than positive ones.
(ii) Estimation of dynamic conditional correlation
In this step the dynamic correlation is modeled using a dynamic conditional correlation
(DCC) model. The DCC model can be written as:
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[
rm,t
ri,t
]
= H
1
2
t
[
εm,t
εi,t
]
Ht = D
1
2
t RtD
1
2
t
Dt =
[
σ2m,t 0
0 σ2i,t
]
Rt =
[
1 ρi,t
ρi,t 1
]
Ht is the time-varying conditional covariance matrix and Dt is estimated separately
using univariate equations. The parameter of interest Rt is modeled using an intermediate
form Qt to assure that the resulting matrix is indeed a correlation matrix (i.e. diagonal
elements equal to one and all other elements lower than or equal to one in absolute value).
The equation for Qt is given by:
Qt = (1− λ1 − λ2)R¯ + λ1εt−1ε′t−1 + λ2Qt−1
where R¯ is the unconditional covariance matrix of the standardized residuals. For Qt
to be stationary and positive definite some conditions must be satisfied:
λ1 ≥ 0
λ2 ≥ 0
λ1 + λ2 < 1
Given that Qt is not necessarily a correlation matrix, it is transformed in the following
way:
Rt = Q
∗− 12
t QtQ
∗− 12
t
where Q∗t is a diagonal matrix with the elements of Qt on its diagonal.
The DCC model used for the MES is slightly modified and introduces asymmetry in
its specification following Cappiello et al. (2006). In the asymmetric version of the DCC
model two terms are added to control for the asymmetric impact of news:
Qt = (1− λ1 − λ2)R¯− gN + λ1εt−1ε′t−1 + gνt−1ν
′
t−1 + λ2Qt−1
where νt = εt1(εt<0) and N = (1/T )
∑T
t=1 νtν
′
t. The conditions to ensure positive
definiteness of Qt are very similar:
λ1 ≥ 0
λ2 ≥ 0
g ≥ 0
λ1 + λ2 + δg < 1
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where δ is the maximum eigenvalue of S−
1
2NS−
1
2 .
(iii) Tail expectations
Using the results from step (i) and (ii), we can calculate εm,t and ξi,t:
m,t =
rm,t
σm,t
ξi,t =
ri,t − σi,tρi,tεm,t
σi,t
√
1− ρ2i,t
from which we can then estimate the following tail expectations:
Et−1 (ξi,t|εm,t < c) and Et−1 (εm,t|εm,t < c)
where c = C
σm,t
. Using a simple conditional average could result in unstable estimators
when c is large in absolute value, since the conditioning event is only observed in a small
number of instances. Brownlees and Engle (2017) instead propose a kernel estimation
approach. It starts from the following relationships:
Et−1(εm,t|εm,t < c) =
∫ c
−∞
εm,tf(u|u < c)du
f(u|u < c) = f(u)
Pr(u < c)
=
f(u)
F (c)
The density function can be estimated using the kernel estimator:
fˆ(u) =
1
Th
T∑
t=1
φ
(
u− εm,t
h
)
Pr(u < c) =
∫ c
−∞
fˆ(u)du
=
1
Th
T∑
t=1
∫ c
−∞
φ
(
u− εm,t
h
)
du
=
1
T
T∑
t=1
Φ
(
c− εm,t
h
)
where h is an appropriately chosen bandwidth (usually 1.06σˆT−0.2) and Φ(.) is the
Gaussian kernel function. This solution then leads to:
Et−1(εm,t|εm,t < c) =
∑t−1
j=1 εmjΦ
( c−εmj
h
)∑t−1
j=1 Φ
( c−εmj
h
)
Et−1(ξi,t|εm,t < c) =
∑t−1
j=1 ξijΦ
( c−εmj
h
)∑t−1
j=1 Φ
( c−εmj
h
)
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Appendix 2: Sample of banks
Country Bank name Country Bank name
Austria
Raiffeisen Bank International Bank of Attica
Erste Group Bank National Bank of Greece
Belgium
KBC Greece Piraeus Bank
Dexia Alpha Bank
Bulgaria
Central Cooperative Bank Eurobank Ergasias
First Investment Bank Hungary OTP Bank
Cyprus
Bank of Cyprus Bank of Ireland
Hellenic Bank Ireland Permanent Tsb
Czech Republic Komercni Banka Allied Irish Banks
UmweltBank Banca Popolare di Milano
MLP Banca Piccolo Credito Valtellinese
Deutsche Postbank Banca Popolare dell’Emilia Romagna
Germany Wustenrot & Wurttembergische Intesa Sanpaolo
Merkur-Bank Banca Intermobiliare di Investimenti e Gestioni
Aareal Bank Banca Popolare di Sondrio
Deutsche Bank Banco di Sardegna
Commerzbank Banca Popolare di Spoleto
Nordfyns Bank Italy Banco di Desio e della Brianza
Oestjydsk Bank Credito Emiliano
Bank of Greenland-Gronlandsbanken Unione di Banche Italiane
Kreditbanken UniCredit
Danske Bank Banca Popolare dell’Etruria e del Lazio
Skjern Bank Banca Mediolanum
Vestjysk Bank Banco Popolare
Denmark Jyske Bank Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena
Sydbank Banca Carige
Lollands Bank Bank of Valletta
Ringkjoebing Landbobank Malta FIMBank
Nordjyske Bank HSBC Bank Malta
Spar Nord Bank Van Lanschot
Jutlander Bank The Netherlands ABN AMRO
Totalbanken ING
Moens Bank Alior Bank
Djurslands Bank Bank BGZ BNP Paribas
Danske Andelskassers Bank Bank Handlowy w Warszawie
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Bank Millennium
Bankia Bank Ochrony Srodowiska
Bankinter Poland Bank BPH
Spain Banco Popular Espanol mBank
Banco de Sababell ING Bank Slaski
Banco Santander Bank Zachodni WBK
Caixabank Getin Noble Bank
Unicaja Banco Bank Polska Kasa Opieki
Liberbank Powszechna Kasa Oszczednosci Bank Polski
Estonia AS LHV Banco Comercial Portugues
Finland Aktia Bank Portugal Banco Espirito Santo
Société Générale Banco BPI
France BNP Paribas Banca Comerciala Carpatica
Crédit Agricole Romania BRD-Groupe Societe Generale
Crédit Industriel et Commercial Banca Transilvania
Standard Chartered Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken
HSBC Swedbank
Close Brothers Sweden Nordea Bank
Arbuthnot Banking Svenska Handelsbanken
United Kingdom Lloyds Banking Group
Barclays
Royal Bank of Scotland
Cybg
Virgin Money Holdings
Sample of banks
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